Comments to the Federal Communications Commission – Antitrust, Two-Sided Markets, and Platform Competition: The Case of the XM-Sirius Merger

Comments to the Federal Communications Commission – Antitrust, Two-Sided Markets, and Platform Competition: The Case of the XM-Sirius Merger

Antitrust oversight is crucial for maintaining vibrant competition. Evaluating mergers of platforms carrying digital content such as the proposed merger of XM and Sirius, however, poses new challenges for antitrust officials. In particular, companies like these are platforms in two-sided markets that must find ways to attract subscribers and content. Both subscribers and content providers can choose among a variety of platforms. Moreover, the platforms themselves are dynamic in that they could potentially carry any digital information, not just the particular services they currently offer.

In short, a merger analysis of competing platforms that considers only a single component in this complex market is likely to reach an incorrect conclusion. In the case of the XM-Sirius merger, officials should consider not only subscribers, but also content providers, competing platforms, platforms that are potential competitors, and services the platforms in question may provide in the future that they do not today.

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Scott Wallsten is President and Senior Fellow at the Technology Policy Institute, a Policy Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), and a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy. He is an economist with expertise in industrial organization and public policy, and his research focuses on competition, regulation, telecommunications, the economics of digitization, and technology policy. He was the economics director for the FCC's National Broadband Plan and has been a lecturer in Stanford University's public policy program, director of communications policy studies and senior fellow at the Progress & Freedom Foundation, a senior fellow at the AEI–Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, an economist at the World Bank, and a staff economist at the U.S. President's Council of Economic Advisers. He holds a PhD in economics from Stanford University.

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