Two Think Minimum: Jonathan Nuechterlein and Howard Shelanski on the third edition of Digital Crossroads

Note: this is a lightly edited transcript.

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Scott Wallsten: Welcome to Two Think Minimum, the podcast of the Technology Policy Institute. I’m Scott Wallsten, and today is Friday, May 8, 2026. A lot of very smart people spent the late 1990s and early 2000s fighting over how to force the Bell companies to share their networks with new competitors. It didn’t really work, but it also turned out not to matter much because mobile and broadband made the local telephone market mostly obsolete on their own. My guests today think there are important lessons in that for current tech debates. Jon Nuechterlein and Howard Shelanski have just published the third edition of Digital Crossroads, the leading reference on telecom law and policy, out this month from MIT Press. Jon is a nonresident senior fellow here at TPI, a distinguished scholar at the GW Competition Law Center, and a lecturer in law at Stanford Law School. Howard is co-head of the Davis Polk Antitrust and Competition Practice and a professor of law at Georgetown University.

The new edition updates the field’s go-to reference on spectrum, broadband, universal service, video, and the rest of telecom law and policy. It also adds a chapter applying 50 years of telecom regulation to today’s tech competition debates. We talk about network effects, scale, and switching costs. We get into proposals to force big platforms to share their data, the mixed record of the 1996 Act, the T-Mobile/Sprint merger, and what Starlink does to the spectrum story, where Universal Service goes after BEAD, and whether AI might do to Google Search what mobile did to the Bell System. Here’s our conversation.

Scott Wallsten: So, Jon and Howard, thanks for coming on the podcast today.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: It’s a pleasure to be here, Scott.

Howard Shelanski: Always a pleasure, thanks.

Scott Wallsten: This is the third edition of Digital Crossroads. Tell us why now. It’s been 13 years since the second edition. What’s changed in the field that makes it feel like it’s time, and what stayed stable enough that the original architecture still works?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: We first published this book in 2005, and I use the term “we” broadly because, of course, my first co-author was Phil Weiser, who is now Attorney General of Colorado and running for governor. We wrote the book mainly because we saw a need for it. There was a lot of ferment, as you know, about telecom policy around the turn of the century, especially in the wake of the 1996 Act, and there weren’t a lot of accessible sources for training people in the technological, economic, and legal dimensions of that debate. So we sat down to write the book that we wished we’d had when we were learning the field back in the late ‘90s.

Obviously, a lot has changed since 2005, but the purpose of the book remains the same. It’s really twofold. One is to help newcomers to the field climb the learning curve as efficiently as possible. The other is to serve as a treatise on telecommunications law and policy in the U.S., and as a reference source even for experienced practitioners in the field.

We published our second edition in 2013, eight years after the first, and that was a very significant revision. What had become evident between 2005 and 2013 is that the 1996 Act, particularly the market-opening provisions regarding the local landline telephone market, had become almost technological curiosities in retrospect. It was already clear, even in 2005, that the future of this market lay in broadband and wireless, and not in telephone service markets. So, we reoriented the book to reflect that back in 2013.

You ask why we’ve published a third edition. The simple answer is that 13 years is still a long time in this field. There obviously have been a lot of significant advances and a lot of significant new policy problems since 2013 that the FCC, the courts, and policymakers have struggled to resolve. It seemed like the right time to bring the book back up to date.

Scott Wallsten: You sort of framed it as an introduction and a handbook for people coming to the field, but it also became sort of a how-to for everybody—the main reference everybody used. It explained all of the issues and broke down the barriers that confused people. Do you view this new edition in a similar way? Is it targeted at practitioners in the same way that the first editions were?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Practitioners and academics, policymakers more generally. I’ll let Howard speak a bit more about the following because he was the principal author of Chapter 10, the concluding chapter of the book. One of the things that we saw a need to do here was explain how the lessons of telecommunications policy are extremely informative when we approach similar issues regarding competition and market power in high-tech markets. The first nine chapters of the book are, as before, about competition in telecommunications markets, including wireless, wireline, broadband, satellite, and video. But Chapter 10 looks to the present set of controversies regarding Google and Meta and Apple and Amazon, and the antitrust cases that have been brought against them, and analyzes the deep family resemblance between the economic issues that informed those cases and the economic issues that gave rise to a lot of creative market-opening initiatives back in ’96 and the years thereafter.

Howard Shelanski: I’d just build on that by saying that the early editions of the book were trying to make sense of changes as they were happening, and to tie them back to the 1996 Act and some of the very important market-opening provisions of that act. As Jon said early on, it became clear that the ’96 Act did some very important things, but probably the things that the ’96 Act drafters thought were the most important were not the things that turned out to be most important. It was things like preemption of state monopoly franchises, mandatory interconnection of wireless networks that were very important. A lot of the local telco wireline unbundling provisions and market-opening provisions were fast superseded by broadband, which was largely not covered or covered obliquely by the Act, and by wireless, which was not recognized at the time of the ’96 Act as being a full-on competitor to wireline. Seems sort of quaint in hindsight.

But by 2005, when the first book was written, there was a real need to take a lot of the doctrinal knowledge, the historical knowledge, the technical legal wrangling over the 1996 Act, and start to put it in place in an integrated policy and legal and economic framework. To say: what is happening, what have the impacts been, what is the right path? There was a normative component of the book that did not exist in a lot of the materials that came before it. Shortly after the 1996 Act, I got together with a couple of other then-young academics and we wrote a telecom textbook, building on Tom Krattenmaker’s very early foundational book. That was a casebook, [but] it was utterly useless for anybody who did not have a professor in front of the classroom contextualizing and walking them through the material. What Jon and Phil did that was so needed and so valuable, and frankly supplanted the need for a casebook, was to treat the subject in a readable, integrated, somewhat more normative framework.

Fast forward to the third edition. There’s a big sense that a lot of the ’96 Act is, I don’t want to pejoratively call it a dead letter, but in some sense a lot of that Act is a dead letter. So the question is, what remains of this legal and intellectual infrastructure that was developed between 1996 and today, this roughly 30-year period, that will inform the current state of the landscape in telecommunications, but also all of the things that are now much more valuable in our everyday life that run on top of those communications, the applications layer? The effort in this version was to go back to the previous chapters, revisit them, and talk about them in light of the additional history that had developed since the last edition. Do more of an assessment, an analytical take, of what was relevant, what wasn’t still relevant, what the impacts of those policies had been, and then turn around and apply those lessons to emerging technologies and the applications layer.

The important thing about Chapter 10, and where the book takes us, is that it’s not simply a statement that we learned lots of great stuff from the ’96 Act that we can turn around and apply. It’s more. What lessons did we learn about what applies and what doesn’t apply? What are the economic analogies, and where do they break down? Where is the case for regulation strong, and where have we learned that it might not be as strong as it looked from certain kinds of structural indicia of the marketplace? I think what you see in Chapter 10, leave it to the readers to judge for themselves, is a measured look at the ways that the lessons of the last 30 years inform what we should do, but also what we should not do, as we look at these emerging technologies.

Scott Wallsten: One of the great things about the first couple of editions is that they looked back in history and explained everything, but then [also provided] a toolkit for looking forward and applying those lessons to address the issues that were on the horizon. This edition does the same thing. It takes all of these lessons from that history and turns around and says, what can we learn from this for what we’re dealing with now, in addition to all of the huge telecom issues that still exist?

So, what are the answers to all the questions you just asked? What are the lessons that we take going forward?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: When you think about what makes telecommunications markets historically susceptible to market power, you think about intense network effects, scale economies, and switching costs up to a point. Those economic phenomena also describe the market power of Google search, or Apple’s operating system, or Amazon’s online store, or Meta’s social network, in different forms of course. You see a lot of indirect network effects, for example, in the context of mobile operating systems, and in online marketplaces. But you see these economic phenomena, and they drive enduring market power and have a tendency to result in highly concentrated markets, giving rise to competition questions.

So then you ask, what are the appropriate solutions in tech markets, to the extent you perceive a problem with enduring market power? If you look back to the ’96 Act, Congress had some prescriptions for markets with those characteristics. It imposed interconnection requirements, asset-sharing requirements, number portability requirements. All these have counterparts, particularly in the remedial phases of pending antitrust suits, regarding issues such as interoperability, data sharing, or data portability. The success or failure of the ’96 Act initiatives carry important lessons for us as we look to both the antitrust cases and the broader proposals that the U.S. adopt a European-style prescriptive regulatory approach to Big Tech.

Scott Wallsten: One of the things that I think is so great about this book, and all the editions, is that you make a point, and then what follows is not necessarily what people think will follow. From what you just said, there are probably people who think, “yeah, somebody should be talking about this market-power issue.” But then I think you have a different opinion on the so-called remedies that people think we should use and how effective they are, because you talk about the effects of unbundling and so on. The answers to the possible issues you’re proposing are not necessarily what people think, which makes the book so valuable.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Yeah, we tried to be a little bit agnostic on the appropriate answers, but our abiding commitment is to some kind of cost-benefit analysis. We saw, for example, that the facilities-unbundling obligations in the ’96 Act, which were all the rage back in the late years of the 1990s, were extremely disruptive and at the end didn’t accomplish very much, because the whole set of issues was overtaken by events, the events being the emergence of broadband and mobile as substitutes for landline telephony. To the extent that folks are talking about novel, highly intrusive data-sharing requirements, particularly when imposed through a regulatory mandate as opposed to an antitrust remedy, we think that the lessons of the ’96 Act are well worth bearing in mind.

Howard Shelanski: Yeah, and we were somewhat agnostic in a way because I’m not sure Jon and I agreed 100 percent on all fronts on the wisdom, or at least the feasibility, of using certain of the remedies that have been previously used throughout the history of the 1996 Act and its implementation in these newer contexts. We probably shared a wariness about using those remedies. I might, and previous writings of mine probably indicate this, might have been a little bit more bullish on some of the data-sharing and interoperability and interconnection remedies and their applicability. Jon might have been in some cases more skeptical. But neither of us thought that the lessons sort of automatically apply.

What we were trying to do was to say, look, the history here is complex. You have to look at the facts carefully where there were successes, and equally where there were failures, before you can immediately infer that the same success or failure will occur in these newer contexts. And to try to give people the history from which they could assess the viability of these tools as remedies or as regulatory approaches to this application layer, the new technologies that were running on top of the infrastructure that had really been the focus of the ’96 Act and what came after.

Scott Wallsten: You also note that not a lot of people have made this analogy, and not many are using this history to help inform decision-making. Why do you think that is? Is it just that every time a new technology comes around, we think we have to reinvent the wheel?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Well, part of it is simply that you have two different communities of people, with only a limited amount of overlap. There’s the group of people who know a whole lot about the Telecommunications Act of 1996. There’s the group of people who know a whole lot about antitrust economics and the current cases. The overlap is limited, as I say, but Howard and I are in the overlap, and so it was fun for us to link up the two fields to remind people that a lot of these issues that are the focus of a lot of economic and legal commentary today bear a strong family resemblance to issues that exercised people 30 years ago in the wake of the ’96 Act.

By the way, I should point out that most of the book is not about the ’96 Act. When I think back to the first edition, the initial drafts of that had four distinct chapters about the Telecommunications Act of 1996. That ended up being two chapters plus an appendix.  So we’ve gone from three chapters on the ’96 Act in the first edition to a third of a chapter in this third edition.

The rest of the book is about enduring policy questions that continue to be the source of great controversy today. These include such matters as broadband regulation, net neutrality, spectrum policy, digital equity, and video competition policy. So we can talk about how the ’96 Act has faded in relevance, but spectrum policy is front and center in today’s policy debates, and it is as fascinating as it has ever been.

Howard Shelanski: Yeah, I think it is important to recognize that even though this book does inflect to Chapter 10, several really important chapters cover issues that are current, ongoing policy questions within the telecommunications world. Video programming, universal service and access. The issues have changed somewhat, but they’re incredibly important, as the importance of the services that run over the infrastructure has grown. In education, access, economic opportunity, literacy, learning, all of the rest, those issues have actually only grown. So when we think about spectrum policy, video programming, access, and equity, those are current issues that are very significant. We do try to show how those have evolved and to draw on the lessons of the past for thinking about those going forward.

Scott Wallsten: I think the book does a great job of reframing some of those old questions to recognize how technology has changed, when you talk about the role of low-earth-orbit satellites, for example, and how things like that affect competition and what it means for convergence. You also talk about the T-Mobile/Sprint merger, and are fairly positive about it, I think. At the time, the idea was that Dish would become a fourth competitor. As we know, that did not happen, but competition came from other sources, other areas. So what should we draw from this whole experience and the evolution of spectrum in the wireless industry?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: It’s funny that you should mention that merger, because I’m teaching an antitrust class at Stanford this quarter, and we taught that case in our last class meeting, and it sparked a lively discussion. One of the interesting lessons from that is that you can try to design a regulatory fix to address a competition problem, and it can just fall apart, despite almost everyone’s best intentions. The DOJ and the FCC, as you know, had this regulatory solution that involved divestiture of assets to Dish, on the premise that Dish was going to replace Sprint as a healthier and more vigorous facilities-based national provider of wireless services. We all know it didn’t turn out that way. But what is happening is that Dish is ceding a big chunk of spectrum to SpaceX, and it may well not be long before the three major wireless carriers in the U.S. face significant competition from Starlink and other providers of LEO services, at least in less populous areas.

Scott Wallsten: How does that change the way you think about spectrum policy, compared to before?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Look, I think Sprint and T-Mobile emerged as a stronger carrier in the wake of that merger. There’s still going to be concerns about increased concentration in the wireless industry, particularly for the demographic for which T-Mobile and Sprint were next-closest competitors, and that’s budget-conscious customers. So even though Sprint and T-Mobile can give AT&T and Verizon a much better run for their money now as a combined company in terms of high-end performance, you still have the negative effects of having a market that has dwindled temporarily from four competitors to three. That was sort of a mixed bag.

But what I think is encouraging, and I find this encouraging only because I think it will ultimately land us in the right place irrespective of what Dish’s motives may have been from the outset, is that the spectrum has gone to its best use, which is into the hands of what looks to be the next industry maverick in the form of Starlink. That, therefore, is a testament to the power of market transactions to create conditions for greater competition over the long term. And this is a little bit analogous to the fact that mobile itself became, and is continuing to become, a strong competitor to wireline broadband companies in the provision of home broadband services.

Howard Shelanski: And by the way, one of the effects of combining Sprint’s spectrum and T-Mobile’s network is that T-Mobile is now aggressively marketing its home broadband, wireless broadband, in many, many markets in direct competition to the wireline carriers. I agree, the consequences of these transactions are not necessarily one-dimensional, and not necessarily predictable.

Scott Wallsten: Was any of this predictable? I’m not sure that anybody did predict it.

Howard Shelanski: I think what happened with that spectrum, with the spectrum moving into what’s turning out to be a highly productive use, was not at that time predicted. I do think some of the better uses of the combined Sprint and T-Mobile networks, some of that was predicted. It wasn’t believed by some of the skeptics of the transaction, because merging parties are always promising things like this, but in this case, it turned out to be true.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Yeah, it was sort of a classic case of 2 plus 2 equals 5. Sprint had low-band spectrum, T-Mobile had a huge swath of mid-band spectrum.

Howard Shelanski: Yeah.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: And the combination of those two has created a world-class mobile broadband company that’s at least on par with Verizon and AT&T.

Scott Wallsten: You mentioned that the book still discusses issues like universal service, which remains a huge issue with all kinds of problems that have not been solved. Tell us what’s changed in the 13 years since you wrote about it last with universal service, and let’s say digital equity more broadly, because we’ve also had BEAD and other large programs that were supposed to address some of these issues. What’s new compared to before?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: So if we’re talking about subsidies for build-out in high-cost areas, which has always been sort of the core of the discussion of universal service, a whole lot has changed. And the most important thing that’s changed is we seem to have turned the corner in terms of understanding that direct broadband subsidies, funded through general tax revenues, are preferable to industry-funded contributions under a fee system.

Scott Wallsten: When you say we have turned the corner, who’s “we”? Because I certainly hear a lot of people argue against that, even though we all know that it’s correct.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Let’s put it this way. For many years, people like you and me complained that it was economically suboptimal, to say the least, to impose a contribution obligation on a defined subset of an industry. That gives rise to all sorts of distortions. And so we wondered, gosh, why can’t Congress just appropriate money for this purpose? That would be much less distortive. And the answer was, oh, that’s politically infeasible, because Congress doesn’t like to have to add items to its budget. Well, Congress did do that in the form of the BEAD program in 2021. The jury’s still out on the results of that program, but that is a huge program that’s going to bring a lot of significant benefits to a lot of people, and it’s not funded in the perverse way that the FCC’s Universal Service Fund is funded.

As you know, the USF is edging precariously close to a regulatory death spiral: because the FCC refuses to tax broadband itself, the services that are subject to contribution obligations are an increasingly narrow slice of the communications pie, and the extra costs imposed on them by the USF are leading consumers to continue to defect to similar services that are not subject to contribution obligations, thereby requiring the FCC to increase the contribution obligation for the remaining services, and thereby making those services less attractive because they become more expensive over time. I don’t know what the FCC is going to do to fix that problem. I know you’ve written about it, Scott. I think the problem is just sort of inherent in any fee-based system where you’re funding services like broadband that are increasingly supplanting traditional telecommunications services, but you’re funding them on the backs of services like voice and certain business data services that are an increasingly small portion of the pie.

Howard Shelanski: One way to think about it, Scott, is that the funding mechanism for universal service 30 years ago was something of an intellectual problem, coming out of a cross-subsidy system from the Bell System that violated all Ramsey pricing principles. That was sort of extended onto things like the E-rate program for schools and libraries as we began to get internet access coming in. But largely, there was a sufficient volume of those services being consumed that you could generate the funding that you needed, even if it was distortive or inefficient. So in some sense, it was a bit of an academic debate. It took a lot of effort to correct that inefficiency, and there wasn’t the political will to do that. I don’t know how many of Charlie Firestone’s Aspen Institute sessions had a panel that talked about how Congress should appropriate this money, it should be done like general taxation, and not done on a fee-based system.

What’s happened progressively over time is that the underlying core of services available to fund what really needed to be funded has shrunk to the point that it’s just not viable. So it really then forced the issue for Congress, which led to BEAD. And we’ll see where that leads.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Yeah, there are obviously different solutions to the problem. One is you could expand the contribution base to include broadband, for example, or to include Big Tech, which is another one of the proposals. I’m not sure that we’re going to see a repetition of BEAD anytime soon. I think that was the product of a Democrat in the White House and Democrats in Congress controlling the agenda.

Scott Wallsten: It still remains to be seen if we’ll see anything from BEAD itself. We haven’t spent any money. But the financing problem is also partly due to how much we are subsidizing. It seems like part of the question is thinking about what we should be subsidizing. We don’t have to keep the USF at the same size. How much of that is wasted? If we cut the program, the contribution factor and the financing mechanism would be less of an issue.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: And here, I do want to distinguish between different universal service programs. I think there will always be a need for support for some low-income communities.

Scott Wallsten: Absolutely.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: The affordability gap will always be with us. But as to the availability gap, I wonder whether that’s just going to be overtaken by events in the next few years, because these LEO networks are going to scale, and they’re going to be able to reach basically all unserved areas in the U.S. They may come at a higher price than cable broadband does in urban areas, but I’m not sure that that’s a policy problem outside the context of need-based subsidies.

Scott Wallsten: Well, the high-cost part is about half or more of the Universal Service Fund. Your book seems to almost argue that the problem has been solved already. Not quite that far, but talking about all of the new competitors in broadband, most of those are new competitors in areas that we once considered high cost, right?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Yeah, and of course there are debates about how well satellite will scale. There are debates about whether rural communities deserve more affordable and more future-proof fiber networks, as opposed to the more expensive and potentially less future-proof satellite services. Those are debates that we cover in the book. Because we didn’t finish writing the book until the end of last year, we were able to account not just for the Biden NTIA’s approach to those issues, but also the Trump administration’s reversal of several of the Biden administration’s decisions. But over time, if we have this conversation five years from now, I think there will probably be some consensus that we have largely achieved the objective of robust broadband to nearly all areas in the U.S.

Scott Wallsten: So that’s the timeline for the fourth edition, right?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: I think we’re going to let a few more years pass before that comes out.

Scott Wallsten: Another thing that has changed more recently, I guess, is the political nature of the FCC. It’s no longer an independent agency by the chairman’s own comments. How does that affect these analyses and how we should think about things going forward? Or do we not even know the answer to that yet?

Jonathan Nuechterlein: Our book focuses on the merits of the policy questions. It does not focus on the politics of the FCC, and you could write a whole separate book about that set of issues. To the extent that the FCC has become much more politicized in the recent past, that largely focuses on legacy communications law issues, such as the public interest requirements of broadcasters, the news non-distortion policy, the equal time rule. Those are all topics that are heavily influenced by the partisan orientation of this FCC. That said, they’re not really the issues that we focus on in this book. Those are not competition issues, they’re not really economic issues. They also have a real legacy flavor to them, because they are obligations that apply mainly to an industry, the broadcasting industry, that is becoming decreasingly relevant to most Americans.

Scott Wallsten: We should probably wrap up momentarily, but I’m pretty sure that it’s illegal to have any conversation without talking about AI. So let’s talk about that for just a second. You talk about AI a bit in the book, but not a whole lot. That leads to two questions. First, in some ways, that seems like a good decision to me, because that means you’re not falling into the hype, and we don’t really know exactly what to think yet. But how would we apply your frameworks to what we’re seeing in AI? And of course, what we’re seeing in AI is different today than it will be tomorrow, so the question is hard to answer.

Howard Shelanski: I’ll take a swing at that, Scott. We dip a toe in that in Chapter 10. But we put the book to rest roughly a year ago, and when you think about that, that’s an eon in AI time. I do think that the book provides a useful framework and useful tools to think about some of the questions surrounding whether and how AI needs to be regulated. And I’m not talking about safety regulation and some of the social regulation, but about the ability to keep competing large language models, competing foundation models, in the marketplace, and ensuring that the suite of products that run on top of them interoperate with them, allow sharing and collaboration amongst them, keep that ecosystem healthy. I do think that some of the tools that we talk about in Chapter 10, and the way we apply them in Chapter 10, are instructive.

The thing that’s interesting, and that is changing almost by the month at this point, is the extent to which the technology and the underlying economics of that technology either add to or subtract from the case for these kinds of regulatory interventions. So let’s think about complementary products that might interconnect with, collaborate with, run on top of an AI platform of some kind, a large language model. When you start talking about agents that effectively write these applications as you go, in a bespoke fashion, how does anybody get dominance at an application layer that runs on top of LLMs and things like that? So really then, what you need is the ability of these bots, of these agents, to access somebody’s data, no matter where it is deposited, on different systems, different models. And we start to shift towards a real question about data portability and accessibility and the APIs that allow for that.

So it brings up some of the same kinds of issues we talk about in Chapter 10 that have been talked about in lots of different technologies, but in an extremely dynamic technological setting, and may shift the focus very much to getting to the data that people need, as opposed to infrastructure interoperability. So I think we provide a framework and some tools, but I don’t think we have an answer, because the technology is changing so quickly. Hopefully we give policymakers, practitioners, and academics a set of lessons and tools that they can then take forward and see the extent to which they are relevant or not, analogous or not, to the real-time developments that are occurring in AI.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: There’s another point about AI that I might mention, which is its ability to shatter conceptions of markets and market power. Another one of the cases that I’ve been teaching recently is the Google search case and remedies order. The Google remedies order, of course, came out less than a year ago. I was teaching it a few weeks ago, and the class had the reaction that this order seems dated even now. There’s this continuing premise that there’s a defined market called the general search engine market that is the subject of these economic forces that will, irrespective of remedy, perhaps ensure Google’s market power in this market for many, many years to come. But the reality is, I’m not sure there’s going to be a general search engine market in five years. I think it may be completely supplanted by advances in AI, and maybe Google will play an outsized role in that market as well, but I don’t know.

But I was also asking myself, what does this remind me of? And what it reminded me of was everyone’s premise around at the turn of the century that the Bell companies’ control of the local exchange market was enduring and required regulatory surgery to unpry. But of course, what happened was that market faded into obsolescence. It was eclipsed by technological progress in the form of broadband and mobile. I wonder whether we’re going to see AI performing that role for a variety of markets today where we see market problems. This is not to say, obviously, that we shouldn’t undertake regulatory solutions or antitrust enforcement where necessary. But it is actually a refreshing reminder that in the long term, perhaps the very long term, innovation is going to change the very nature of the market problems that we consider to be so permanent today.

Scott Wallsten: Absolutely. With that, we should probably wrap it up, and I would commend everyone to buy this book and read it, because it is going to be, again, the handbook that everybody needs. I promise you, we [TPI] are making no commission on it, although I hope you guys are, because if not, you have to get a new agent. So thanks so much for joining me. It’s always fun talking to you, and we’ll talk again soon.

Jonathan Nuechterlein: It’s our pleasure. Thanks, Scott.

Howard Shelanski: Thanks, Scott.