The panel on February 24, 2026 featured spectrum experts Austin Bonner (HWG LLP), Umair Javed (CTIA), David Redl (Salt Point Strategies), and moderator Sarah Oh Lam (TPI).
With roughly 20 months until the World Radiocommunication Conference convenes in Shanghai in October 2027, the United States faces a unique combination of diplomatic, logistical, and strategic challenges. In our third panel of the 2026 TPI Winter Spectrum Series, three former members of prior U.S. WRC preparations assessed the current state of preparations and offered candid advice on what needs to happen.
Top 5 Takeaways
- The U.S. needs delegation leadership earlier in the process. With 20 months to go, the lack of a named head of delegation is a liability. Creative staffing solutions exist, but finding qualified individuals willing to take temporary government posts remains the core challenge.
- WRC-27 is bigger than Agenda Item 1.7. While the President’s 6G memorandum specifically called out Agenda Item 1.7, an unprecedented level of presidential direction on a single WRC agenda item, tunnel vision on the 4 and 7 GHz bands risks leaving the U.S. unprepared on satellite, EPFD reform, and lunar spectrum issues and without the leverage needed for the horse-trading that drives WRC outcomes. The domestic picture is also more complicated than it appears: panelists noted tension between the legislation, the presidential memorandum, and WAC guidance, with David Redl observing the WAC position would “do internationally what is literally illegal domestically.”
- Shanghai as host city gives China leverage over process and substance. China operates as a command economy with outcome-driven spectrum decisions, not the market-derived, multi-stakeholder process familiar in the U.S. Panelists agreed China wants to foreclose alternatives to its IMT dominance but disagreed on why. Umair Javed argued China aims to block competition from trusted alternative ecosystems, including allied manufacturers and emerging Open RAN deployments. David Redl countered that calling this “American-led” is misleading given that equipment is built by Nordic and Korean firms, and argued China’s deeper motivation is maintaining centralized network architectures that enable surveillance through Belt and Road deployments. The exchange highlighted an unresolved fault line in how the U.S. frames its own competitive position.
- Regional diplomacy is the strongest predictor of success. CITEL positions need to be locked down before the April meeting, and bilateral engagement with allies should already be underway.
- The U.S. delegation needs more people, not fewer. The trend toward smaller delegations should be reversed. Relaxing restrictions on contractors and lobbyists and ensuring sustained industry participation are all critical to competing effectively across the full agenda.
20 Months to Go
The FCC hosted a WAC meeting on February 19, NTIA published recommendations on February 18, and consensus and non-consensus agenda items were released on February 23. Comments are due March 6 ahead of the CITEL (Inter-American Telecommunication Commission) PCC.II (Americas) meetings in April and December 2026, meaning the U.S. needs solidified positions soon. The U.S. also needs to be prepared for the 2026 Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-26) which will be held from November 9-27, 2026 in Doha, Qatar.
Panelists warned that the bigger risk is the domestic interagency process. The U.S. has struggled in recent WRC cycles with industries and federal agencies threatening to derail the process when they don’t get everything they want. As David Redl put it, showing up with a position on which you’ve decided “I can make no compromises at all” guarantees your bill never becomes law. Umair Javed added that federal agencies are just as likely as industry to blow up the process, and that early leadership is critical to preventing it.
Panelists emphasized the need for early leadership and that the U.S. would do well to have a named head of delegation earlier in the process. The six-month mark for special ambassador-level appointments with 9 month terms is April 2027, but groundwork needs to start well before then. While there are creative staffing mechanisms such as Schedule C appointments at the State Department, the recurring challenge is finding qualified individuals willing to serve a temporary government post during the time before the WRC meetings.
Beyond Agenda Item 1.7
A recurring theme was the risk of tunnel vision. While the administration has shared the NTIA recommendation on Agenda Item 1.7, covering the 4 and 7 GHz bands critical to 5G and the race to 6G, panelists cautioned that U.S. positions on agenda items for WRC-27 encompasses a full suite of agenda items. The U.S. must also understand satellite positions, NGSO-GSO dynamics, EPFD power limit reform, and lunar spectrum issues.
Success at WRC requires the kind of horse-trading familiar to any legislative process: knowing what you want, what you’re willing to give up, and how to buy time on issues that aren’t yet ripe. As panelist David Redl put it, the goal is consensus, getting parties “just unhappy enough to keep their mouth shut.”
The China Factor
Hosting in Shanghai adds a layer of complexity that the panel discussed at length. Key concerns include:
Strategic assessment. Panelists called for a detailed, rigorous assessment of China’s interests and tactics, going beyond superficial understanding of their wireless and satellite strategies. One suggestion was for Congress to commission CRS or GAO reports on the topic and share findings with allies.
Different motivations. China operates as a command economy with outcome-driven spectrum decisions, not the market-derived, multi-stakeholder process familiar in the U.S. Their push for IMT spectrum is tied to maintaining dominance in equipment manufacturing (Huawei, ZTE), Belt and Road influence, and foreclosing competition from U.S.-led technology stacks like Open RAN.
Host country influence. The ITU has no formal definition of consensus, and the host country can exert significant influence over both substance and process. The WRC-23 cycle demonstrated how much this matters. Panelists also flagged practical security concerns. The U.S. government guidance will likely restrict what devices can be brought into China and what networks can be used, raising questions about the level of personnel that can be sent to a month-long conference.
Diplomacy Starts Now
Panelists stressed that the diplomatic work, with allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea, and with fence-sitters like India and Indonesia, needs to be well underway. CITEL, the regional body for the Americas, is a critical venue. Regional consensus is the strongest predictor of success at WRC, even though CITEL countries “fight like siblings.” Mexico’s role on the 7 GHz agenda and Brazil’s support for IMT positions will be important barometers.
However, David Redl noted that China has significant influence with some CITEL countries, particularly Mexico and Brazil, making the regional discussions a potential bellwether for how arguments will play out on the global stage. Austin Bonner also reminded the panel that WRC diplomacy does not happen in a vacuum: the U.S. is entering this conference while a land war is in progress in Europe, NATO is in a different posture than in prior cycles, and America’s role as a military systems exporter creates unexpected interactions with commercial spectrum negotiations. Practical logistics also matter: the April CITEL meeting in Dominica will be expensive and difficult to reach, potentially limiting participation from some countries.
Resourcing the Delegation
The panel identified several resource challenges and opportunities.
Size matters. There has been a trend toward reducing the size of the U.S. delegation, but panelists argued this deserves reconsideration. Flooding the zone with knowledgeable people across ad hoc groups and margin discussions is a proven strategy.
Industry investment. WRC is a three-week commitment in a costly international city. U.S. companies and agencies need to budget for sustained participation, not just at the conference itself, but in the working party and conference preparatory meetings leading up to it.
Revisit restrictions on contractors and lobbyists. Current rules prevent government contractors from acting as delegation leaders and bar registered lobbyists from participating which limits the pool of experienced negotiators.
The Broader Chessboard
Several additional issues round out the strategic landscape.
NGSO vs. GSO and LEO leadership. The EPFD (Equivalent Power Flux Density) power limit issue was kicked down the road from the last conference and is now urgent. The U.S. has a clear interest in promoting American LEO leadership with major constellations in orbit and those soon to be deployed, but this must be balanced against building consensus on other issues.
Plenipotentiary dynamics. The U.S. is running a candidate for the Radio Regulations Board (Jennifer Warren) and supporting Doreen Bogdan-Martin (running unopposed for ITU Secretary-General). These races consume diplomatic capital that intersects with WRC-27 negotiations.
Keeping the ITU focused. Panelists endorsed a back-to-basics approach, keeping the conference focused on the heartland of the radio regulations rather than allowing issues beyond radio spectrum policy to creep in.
What Needs to Happen Next
Panelists recommended next steps for WRC-27 preparations. They recommended the U.S. develop a comprehensive strategy across all agenda items, not just 1.7, including a clear understanding of trade-offs between terrestrial and satellite interests. A rigorous assessment of China’s WRC interests and tactics should be conducted and shared with allied delegations. Diplomatic engagement should be ongoing now through CITEL, bilateral discussions, and coalition-building with like-minded countries. The U.S. position should be developed with comments filed at the FCC by March 6 in OET Docket No. 24-30 to shape U.S. positions in response to the FCC’s WAC recommendations ahead of the April CITEL meeting.
Coming Up Next in the TPI Winter Spectrum Series
Don’t miss the next installment of the 2026 TPI Winter Spectrum Series! On March 10 at 11 am on Zoom, we will host “Fireside Chat with NTIA Administrator Arielle Roth” on spectrum policy, 6G, WRC-27, and other topics such as BEAD and permitting reform. Register here!
Scott Wallsten is President and Senior Fellow at the Technology Policy Institute and also a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy. He is an economist with expertise in industrial organization and public policy, and his research focuses on competition, regulation, telecommunications, the economics of digitization, and technology policy. He was the economics director for the FCC's National Broadband Plan and has been a lecturer in Stanford University’s public policy program, director of communications policy studies and senior fellow at the Progress & Freedom Foundation, a senior fellow at the AEI – Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, an economist at The World Bank, a scholar at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, and a staff economist at the U.S. President’s Council of Economic Advisers. He holds a PhD in economics from Stanford University.
Sarah Oh Lam is a Senior Fellow at the Technology Policy Institute. Oh completed her PhD in Economics from George Mason University, and holds a JD from GMU and a BS in Management Science and Engineering from Stanford University. She was previously the Operations and Research Director for the Information Economy Project at George Mason School of Law. She has also presented research at the 39th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference and has co-authored work published in the Northwestern Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property among other research projects. Her research interests include law and economics, regulatory analysis, and technology policy.
