The FCC has taken three different competition policy approaches: the classic role of regulating terms and conditions of sale, the modern role of using various tools to create largely deregulated, multi-firm, competitive markets, and the laissez-faire approach of believing that unregulated markets, even if monopolized, will produce the best outcome. For the most part, a light-handed modern role has proven successful. The FCC should adopt such an approach going forward with a classic regulatory role as a backstop, and it should articulate clearly its competition policy framework so that firms can understand the rules and compete to provide service to customers in a procompetitive manner.
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Gregory Rosston is Director of the Public Policy Program at Stanford University and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. He is also a Lecturer in Economics and Public Policy at Stanford University where he teaches courses on competition policy and strategy, intellectual property, and writing and rhetoric. Rosston served as Deputy Chief Economist at the Federal Communications Commission working on the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and he helped to design and implement the first ever spectrum auctions in the United States. He co-chaired the Economy, Globalization and Trade committee for the Obama campaign and was a member of the Obama transition team. He has served as a consultant to various organizations including the World Bank and the FCC, and as a board member and advisor to high technology, financial, and startup companies. Rosston received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University specializing in the fields of Industrial Organization and Public Finance and his A.B. with Honors in Economics from University of California at Berkeley.
