Posts by Tim Brennan


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Does Section 230 Provide Platforms Too Much or Too Little Immunity?

Perhaps the most prominent current technology policy debates concern “big tech,” specifically Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, and Google.  Perhaps the most politically contentious issue among them involves the ability of these…

Getting rid of Chevron? Be Careful What you Wish For

While unlikely to draw the level of attention given to abortion rights, the Affordable Care Act, and affirmative action, the status of the “Chevron doctrine” is, to many, a crucial…

FCC’s Office of Economics and Analytics: The Remaining Need to Ensure Independence and Relevance

On January the 9th, the FCC released a draft of its order creating a new “Office of Economics and Analytics” (OEA). While some view a separate economics office as a…

Bolstering Economics at the FCC: Will a Separate Office Help?

When I was chief economist at the FCC in 2014, the largest fraction of my time was spent on how to improve the standing of economists and use of economics…
Research Papers

Revised articles from TPI conference “Antitrust and the Dynamics of Competition in High-Tech Industries” Review of Industrial Organization

Attachments Antitrust and the Dynamics of Competition in High-Tech Industries
Research Papers

‘Night of the Living Dead’ or ‘Back to the Future’? Electric Utility Decoupling, Reviving Rate-of-Return Regulation, and Energy Efficiency

The distribution grid for delivering electricity to the user has been paid for as part of the charge per kilowatt-hour that covers the cost of the energy itself. Conservation advocates have promoted the adoption of policies that “decouple” electric distribution company revenues or profits from how much electricity goes through the lines. Their motivation is that usage-based pricing leads utilities to encourage use and discourages conservation. Because decoupling divorces profits from conduct, it runs against the dominant finding in regulatory economics in the last twenty years – that incentive-based regulation outperforms rate-of-return. Even if distribution costs are independent of use, some usage charges can be efficient. Price-cap regulation may distort utility incentives to inform consumers about energy efficiency – getting more performance from less electricity. Utilities will subsidize efficiency investments, but only when prices are too low. Justifying policies to subsidize energy efficiency requires either prices that are too low or consumers who are ignorant.

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