Economic analysis takes as its defining performance benchmark the pursuit of increases in welfare (efficiency). Competition is merely one of a variety of means of achieving the efficiency end, especially in industries where the underlying economic circumstances predispose them towards greatest efficiency when competition (in the form of many market participants) is restricted. Typically, regulatory intervention in these industries is justified by the imperative to increase efficiency. Competition law and industry-specific regulation provide two competing means of intervention whereby the pursuit of efficiency can be enhanced. The challenge is in determining how to allocate responsibility for governance of industry interaction between these two institutional forms. Whilst competition law can govern interaction in most industries, where the underlying economic conditions are sufficiently different, industry-specific regulation offers advantages. However, its weakness is the risk of capture, leading to the subjugation of the efficiency end to the pursuit of other objectives (e.g. competition – the means – as an end in itself). But if the regulatory institution could be bound in some way to pursue an efficiency objective, could the risk of capture be averted?
Antitrust and Competition
Economic analysis of markets is a core part of what we do. Our research has focused on mergers, vertical integration, and global competition policy. Our experts have deep experience in competition policy.
An Examination of the Google-DoubleClick Merger and the Online Advertising Industry: What Are the Risks For Competition and Privacy. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights Committee on the Judiciary
Lenard, Thomas. “An Examination of the Google-DoubleClick Merger and the Online Advertising Industry: What Are the Risks For Competition and Privacy.” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, September 27, 2007.
Lenard, Thomas, Paul Rubin. “Googling ‘Monopoly.'” Wall Street Journal, August 2007.
Comments to the Federal Communications Commission – Antitrust, Two-Sided Markets, and Platform Competition: The Case of the XM-Sirius Merger
Wallsten, Scott. “Comments to the Federal Communications Commission – Antitrust, Two-Sided Markets, and Platform Competition: The Case of the XM-Sirius Merger.” July 2007.
Vista, Open Access and Net Neutrality
Lenard, Thomas M. “Vista, Open Access and Net Neutrality.” November 2006.
DACA Report from the Working Group on New Spectrum Policy, Release 1.0
Lenard, Thomas M. and Lawrence J. White. DACA Report from the Working Group on New Spectrum Policy, Release 1.0. March 2006.
Orbitz: An Antitrust Assessment
Adkinson, Jr., William F. and Thomas M. Lenard. “Orbitz: An Antitrust Assessment.” Antitrust, Spring 2002.