



**Radio “Fences” and Inventor Attention to Property Rights: Evidence from
Wireless Patents**

September 2018

Sarah Oh

Radio “Fences” and Inventor Attention to Property Rights: Evidence from Wireless Patents

Sarah Oh*

September 26, 2018

Abstract: Do the inventors of radio “fences” (which restrict transmissions externalities) care about property rights? I hypothesize that inventors do pay attention to policy regimes such as licensed and unlicensed spectrum when building technologies to handle interference. To answer this question, I conduct textual analysis of 500,000 wireless patents to estimate inventor attention to property rights. I find that inventors are more likely to mention interference and sensor technology if they mention property rights, than if they do not discuss property rights. While further research is needed to determine causality, textual analysis provides evidence of inventor attention to property rights regimes.

Keywords: property rights, spectrum policy, textual analysis

JEL: K11, K23, L51, L96, O31, P14, P48

* Research Fellow, Technology Policy Institute, 409 12th Street SW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20024 (e-mail:soh@techpolicyinstitute.org). Forthcoming in the *Review of Industrial Organization* (2018-2019). The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of TPI’s staff, board of directors, or board of academic advisors.

1 Introduction

Do spectrum property rights help or hurt innovation? Scholars debate whether open commons or flexible licenses better serve ecosystem growth. In developing a theory of innovation, empirical evidence can help explain how inventors respond to property rights. The 90th anniversary of the Radio Act of 1927 seems an appropriate time to consider this interaction of innovation and policy on the radio waves.

2 Background

Ninety years after the Radio Act of 1927, we can study how property rights have influenced innovation with respect to the airwaves.¹ The Radio Act of 1927 started an era of agency regulation of spectrum licensing. Scholars have described the Act as a “calculated rent-sharing arrangement serving the interests of regulators and industry” (Hazlett, 1998, p. 543).

After the Radio Act, use permits and broadcast station authorizations were distributed by regulators at the Federal Radio Commission (1927-1934), which was later renamed the Federal Communications Commission in 1934. Zero-priced awards (“comparative hearings”) have been used to allocate commercial spectrum since 1927, and are still used today for license renewals (Hazlett, 1998, p. 531). Lotteries were authorized by Congress in 1981 as an alternative method to distribute licenses, and were used for many cellular telephone license allocations between 1984 and 1989 (*Id.*). In 1993, Congress authorized yet another method of spectrum allocation: by competitive auction (*Id.*). Competitive auctions have led to efficient exchange of spectrum licenses since 1994 through bid and offer prices for licenses by city according to market demand.

Coase (1959) made a case for future market mechanisms that would better serve economic growth and innovation with respect to radio spectrum, by arguing for the efficacy

¹ The Radio Act of 1927, Public Law No. 632, February 23, 1927, 69th Congress.

of property rights in spectrum licenses. Coase argued that a government regulator could not possibly know as much as industry in predicting future use cases for spectrum. Allocations through agency rulemaking would be inferior to price mechanisms that responded to distributed market knowledge.

Coase did not observe platforms as we know them today, but he consistently emphasized the incentives of property owners. In other articles, he described organizational structures that align incentives for productive activity. By including externalities in the calculus of social cost, he described how agents make decisions that reflect transaction costs and respond to the incentives of alternative governance regimes.

3 Interference and Property Rights

Coase understood that increased activity on the radio waves could increase conflicts. But rules to limit interference also conflict with certain productive pursuits. Coase reasoned that increasing consumer welfare should be the primary economic policy goal, rather than minimizing interference. In fact, optimal congestion may be far from zero, but much closer to “chaos in broadcasting” (Coase, 1959, p. 5).

In this paper, I gather empirical evidence of inventor attention to interference and property rights. I assume that inventors seek to increase spectrum efficiency through new inventions. Inventions may avoid “interference” by reducing emission levels (for radiated power) or improving receivers. The latter may include “filter” or “sensor” technologies. These wireless technologies may be considered radio “fences” that can better define and/or respect noise boundaries across spectrum frequencies.

Inventors of new digital communications may show concern for property rights by discussing “licensed” or “unlicensed” policy regimes in their patent applications. Licensed regimes generally refer to the use of frequencies on an exclusive basis; unlicensed is where

wireless access is non-exclusive. But property rights may not be a primary driver of inventive activity. Network effects may instead be a main motivator of research and development. For example, the number of global users of unlicensed technology may spur ecosystem growth due to the scale of the potential market. Some policymakers have credited the absence of property rights as a driver of rapid uptake of cordless phones and other Part 15 devices (Carter et al., 2003).

However, property rights in spectrum have generated enormous network effects as well. Patents in licensed spectrum bands have outpaced those of unlicensed spectrum. In the cellular bands, tens of thousands of patents have been filed for the CDMA, GSM, and LTE technologies that have become global standards. Handset manufacturers develop new devices annually. Mobile carriers reinvest profits to deploy more wireless infrastructure. This virtuous cycle of reinvestment creates incentives for more discovery and development.

This article presents an introductory treatment of inventor attention to property rights in radio spectrum with the use of methods of textual analysis. Spectrum value caused by property rights has been studied empirically (Hazlett and Honig, 2016). Other studies in law and economics research discuss creative activity that is generated by property rights and other appropriation mechanisms (O'Connor, 2015). With big data tools, we can now apply textual analysis to inventor activity to advance the literature on causal effects of property rights on innovation.

4 Textual Analysis of Radio Patents

Textual analysis is now used in empirical studies of wide-ranging subject matter.² Text mining techniques have been applied to patent databases for many years (Bergeaud et al., 2017; Tseng

² For a brief summary of textual analysis, *see generally*, Merrick, Amy, “Why Words are the New Numbers,” Chicago Booth Review. Mar. 17, 2015, <http://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring-2015/why-words-are-the-new-numbers>.

et al., 2007). Recently, scholars reported success in semantically classifying 4 million patents from the United States Patent & Trademark Office database from 1976 onward with the use of “big data” tools (Bergeaud et al., 2017). Patent text can be analyzed to forecast technology diffusion, with methods such as “text segmentation, summary extraction, feature selection, term association, cluster generation, topic identification, and information mapping” (*Id.*). Specific inventions can be studied through key-word extraction (*Id.*).

Text miners prefer to search for multi-word phrases in patents, rather than single word phrases, to add more specificity in analysis. Key-term-extraction algorithms weigh terms with 1 or 0 values, thereby “denoting the presence or absence of the terms in documents” (*Id.*, p. 1224). Thus, the mean value of terms “becomes a value exactly proportional to the number of documents” in which terms occur (*Id.*). Textual analysis methods include heuristic rules for measuring term co-occurrence and term association (*Id.*).

Finance researchers study patents to predict technology trends (Lerner and Seru, 2015). Forecasting techniques that measure S-shaped growth have been applied to patent text (Daim et al., 2006). While forecasting and diffusion are not relevant to this study, this dataset on radio patents can be used to investigate further questions of innovation in the wireless sector.

4.1 Hypothesis

I investigate inventive activity that is associated with property rights by extracting and counting key terms from radio patents. Inventors who seek to lessen “interference” or build “filters” would cite those terms in their patent filings. Inventors may build “sensors” in response to favorable policy regimes. I estimate inventor attention to property rights by extracting key terms such as “licensed” and “unlicensed” spectrum.

I assume that inventors who discuss terms in their patent filings are concerned about

those terms. If a term appears in more patent filings, I assume that the presence of the term indicates more attention to the issue. Patents do not mean inventions are necessarily valuable, however. Patent filings do not have equal importance or weight in innovative activity. Certain patents may have disproportionate importance, and hundreds of patents may have little or no relevance. There are no straightforward measurement devices, however, to differentiate among these inventions. Hence, we are left with a first approximation. This study treats radio patents as independent and equal in weight.

4.2 Empirical Strategy

I measure inventor attention to interference and property rights through a binary choice logit model. Key term data are extracted in binary format -- 0 or 1 -- which indicates if a term is absent or present in the full text of a patent. In addition to the main terms of interest, I measure the presence of 130 additional terms that are relevant to spectrum policy research.³

Binary choice logit regressions are better suited to analyzing binary data than is ordinary least squares regression.⁴ A binary choice logit model gives probabilities such that $Prob(y > 0) = \Lambda(x\beta) = \exp(x\beta)/(1 + \exp(x\beta))$. Errors are assumed to be distributed with mean 0 and variance of $\pi^2 / 3$, or $\lambda(\epsilon) = e^\epsilon / (1 + e^\epsilon)^2$.

Equation (1) shows the model for $y = 1(InvntionTerm > 0)$, where the dependent variable is an invention term, and independent variables include property rights terms such as “licensed” and “unlicensed.” I test three invention terms: “interference,” “filter,” and “sensor.” Vectors of other terms are included as well: Γ for policy terms; Ω for technology

³I counted key terms taking into account the presence of a plural “s” or not. Several terms were counted with different spellings: Cancellation includes “cancellation” or “cancelation”; CFR includes “CFR,” “C.F.R.,” or “Code of Federal” Regulations; FCC includes “Federal Communications Commission” or “FCC”; TV includes “television” or “TV”; white space includes “white spaces” or “white space”; WiFi includes “Wi-Fi” or “WiFi”; and 3G includes “3G” or “3GPP.” The number of times that a term appeared in the full text of a patent was not measured, which is consistent with key term extraction methods in the literature.

⁴Greene (2008).

terms; and Φ for general terms.

$$Prob(InventionTerm_{it} > 0) = \Lambda(\beta_1 + \beta_2 licensed_{it} + \beta_3 unlicensed_{it} + \Gamma_{it} + \Omega_{it} + \Phi_{it}) \quad (1)$$

The radio patent dataset includes $i = 0$ to 500,000 observations and patents from years $t = 1976$ to 2016. Table 1 includes a list of key terms that are extracted for this study. Invention terms include “interference,” “filter,” and “sensor.” Property rights terms include “licensed” and “unlicensed.” Policy keywords include, for example, “property,” “rights,” and “Federal Communications Commission.” Technology terms include, for example, “3G,” “4G,” “LTE,” “5G,” “CDMA,” “Wi-Fi,” and “white space.” General terms include, for example, “hertz,” “MHz,” “GHz,” “colocation,” “receiver,” and “transmitter.”

Table 1 Key term extraction

Invention Terms	<i>interference, filter, sensor</i>
Property Rights Terms	<i>licensed, unlicensed</i>
Policy Terms, Γ	<i>spectrum, allocation, band, cancellation, CFR, FCC, adjacent, collocation, harmful, monitoring, enforcement, property, rights</i>
Technology Terms, Ω	<i>3G, 4G, 5G, LTE, WiMax, WiFi, GPS, CDMA, MIMO</i>
General Terms, Φ	<i>1927, 1996, AC, AM, analog, antenna, auction, band, base, bluetooth, broadcast, carrier, cell, cellular, channel, CINR, coaxial, code, computer, consumer, current, database, DC, digital, downlink, edge, electromagnetic, error, FDMA, federal, fiber, fixed, FM, frequency, GHz, gigahertz, ground, GSM, handover, HD, hertz, high, Hz, IEEE, industrial, infrared, internet, kHz, kilohertz, Kv, laser, legal, load, low, market, medical, megahertz, MHz, microphone, microwave, millisecond, mobile, multiplex, OFDMA, ohms, PCS, positioning, power, processor, radar, receiver, regulatory, relay, resistor, retail, RF, RSSI, satellite, shared, signal, station, TDMA, telephone, terrestrial, threshold, tower, transceiver, transmitter, TV, UMTS, uplink, v, volts, wave, WCDMA, white space, wireless, xray</i>

4.3 Data

The data come from the United States Patent & Trademark Office Patent Full-Text and Image Database (USPTO Full-Text Database, 2017).⁵ A term search for “radio” resulted in search results for over 500,000 radio patents.⁶ The full-text of these patents was scraped and stored for textual analysis.

Figure 1 shows radio patents compared to all U.S. patents. Patents with the term “radio” appear to decrease in number in 2014, while the total volume of U.S. patents rises rapidly after 2010. An explanation may be that the term “wireless” has grown in popularity for describing technology that utilizes the radio waves, with a decline in the use of the word “radio.” Logit regressions rely on pooled data.




Fig. 1 “Radio” patents

⁵ See also USPTO Statistics (2017).

⁶ Query results contained over 600,000 patents for the term “radio.” Data for this paper contains a sample of 500,000 of these listings from the search query.

Table 2 Selected descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Min	Max
<i>interference</i>	0.23	0	1
<i>filter</i>	0.36	0	1
<i>sensor</i>	0.31	0	1
<i>licensed</i>	0.03	0	1
<i>unlicensed</i>	0.02	0	1
<i>property</i>	0.13	0	1
<i>rights</i>	0.07	0	1
<i>harmful</i>	0.02	0	1
<i>spectrum</i>	0.19	0	1
<i>FCC</i>	0.03	0	1
<i>3G</i>	0.16	0	1
<i>4G</i>	0.05	0	1
<i>5G</i>	0.03	0	1
<i>CDMA</i>	0.18	0	1
<i>LTE</i>	0.10	0	1
<i>Wi-Fi</i>	0.12	0	1
<i>GPS</i>	0.16	0	1

Descriptive Statistics are available in the Data Appendix. Terms have 500,000 observations each.

Table 2 displays selected descriptive statistics for terms in the radio patent dataset. Invention terms are listed at the top. “Interference” appears in an average of 23% of the 500,000 radio patents, while “filter” and “sensor” appear in more patents: 36% and 31%, respectively, of observations in the dataset. Property rights terms -- “licensed” and “unlicensed” -- appear in fewer patents: only 3% and 2%, respectively, of radio patents. This means that of 500,000 radio patents, 15,000 and 10,000 patents include these property-rights terms.

Common policy terms -- such as “property” and “spectrum” -- are used frequently by patent writers: 13% and 19%, respectively, of radio patents include these terms. Other policy terms -- such as “harmful” or “FCC” or “rights” -- appear less frequently: 2%, 3%, and 7%, respectively, of radio patents. Technology terms appear frequently in the dataset, with “GPS” and “3G” appearing in 16% of radio patents. The wireless standard “CDMA” appears in 18% of the patents in this dataset. Other standards -- such as “Wi-Fi” and “LTE” -- appear in 12%

and 10%, respectively, of the radio patents in the dataset.

Firms are identified in the dataset as well. The names of firms were cleaned and simplified to remove miscellaneous spellings. In some instances, firms filed patents with or without abbreviations in their names, using words such as “Corporation” as “Corp.” or “Incorporated” as “Inc.” or “Limited” as “Ltd.” Some discrepancies remain in the dataset, so the number of firms may be overstated. The largest corporate filers, however, were checked for spelling discrepancies.

Figures 2 and 3 provide graphical depictions of changes in key term citations over time. Figure 2 shows one dependent variable -- “interference” -- compared to the property rights terms “licensed” and “unlicensed.” Over 20% of radio patents each year included the term “interference,” with a decline in later years. The term “licensed” appears more frequently each year in radio patents than does “unlicensed.” These terms increase in citation around the year 2004, but do not exceed 2% or 3% each year.

Figure 3 shows the mean value over the years of three dependent variables -- “interference,” “filter,” and “sensor” -- along with a few technology terms. Diffusion of technologies -- such as “GPS,” “LTE,” “3G,” and “Wi-Fi” -- are apparent in an S-curve shape after the year 2005. The term “sensor” increases steadily across the years, while “interference” and “filter” are less present in the text of radio patents. For comparison, the term “MIMO” shows a slight uptick in 2010, but is not cited as frequently as the other technologies.




Fig. 2 Property rights terms




Fig. 3 Technology terms

4.4 Model Assumptions

Binary choice logit models assume that there are no interaction effects between independent variables. Before running logit regressions, I tested correlation coefficients and other diagnostics on the independent variables. The correlation coefficient between the property rights terms, “licensed” and “unlicensed,” is 0.73. These two words are highly correlated in the radio patent dataset. This result can also be seen graphically in Figure 2, where “licensed” and “unlicensed” move together over time. Knowing that there may be a multicollinearity issue with these property rights terms, I also estimate the logit model including only one these terms at a time.

Table 3 shows correlation coefficients for “interference,” “filter,” and “sensor” with “licensed” and “unlicensed.” This table shows, for instance, that patents with “interference” and “licensed” terms are positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.10, while patents with “interference” and “unlicensed” terms are similar with a positive correlation of 0.11. The terms, “filter” and “sensor,” appear to be less correlated with the property rights terms than other terms. Other terms such as “GHz” or “FCC” are positively correlated with “licensed” or “unlicensed” with a correlation coefficient of 0.18.

Further investigation of these other terms may yield interesting results in future studies. The citation of “auction” appears to be more correlated with the term “licensed,” than “unlicensed,” while the term “white space” appears to be more correlated with the term “unlicensed,” than with “licensed.” Notably, the terms “allocation,” “cellular,” and “shared” appear to be more correlated with the term “licensed” than with the term “unlicensed.”

Table 3 Correlation with “licensed” and “unlicensed” terms

Term	<i>licensed</i>	<i>unlicensed</i>
<i>licensed</i>	1.00	0.73
<i>interference</i>	0.10	0.11
<i>filter</i>	0.05	0.04
<i>sensor</i>	0.01	0.01
<i>GHz</i>	0.18	0.22
<i>FCC</i>	0.18	0.18
<i>spectrum</i>	0.18	0.18
<i>WiFi</i>	0.15	0.15
<i>consumer</i>	0.12	0.10
<i>IEEE</i>	0.12	0.13
<i>wireless</i>	0.12	0.11
<i>auction</i>	0.12	0.09
<i>Hz</i>	0.12	0.14
<i>band</i>	0.11	0.11
<i>shared</i>	0.11	0.09
<i>transceiver</i>	0.11	0.11
<i>white space</i>	0.11	0.12
<i>allocation</i>	0.11	0.09
<i>cellular</i>	0.11	0.09
<i>satellite</i>	0.10	0.09
<i>database</i>	0.10	0.06

Correlation coefficients between the invention terms are 0.17 for “interference” and “filter,” -0.01 for “interference” and “sensor,” and 0.07 for “filter” and “sensor.” These results are not included in Table 3, but provide information on the similarity of these three invention terms in radio patents.

5 Results

I tested three invention terms, “interference,” “filter,” and “sensor,” in a binary choice logit model. Odds ratios are presented along with regression results.⁷ For each term of interest, I include figures that show the top firms that filed patents with these terms.

Since $\log(p/(1 - p)) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \text{licensed}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{unlicensed}_{it} + \Gamma_{it} + \Omega_{it} + \Phi_{it}$, we know that

⁷ Fewer than 500,000 observations appear in regression results due to some missing values in the textual analysis.

the odds ratio, *OR*, for *licensed* is e^{β_2} . The odds ratio, *OR*, for *unlicensed* is e^{β_3} . The odds ratio is the relative increase in the odds of the dependent variable -- e.g., *interference* -- going from 0 to 1 when the independent binary variable goes from 0 to 1, holding all other variables fixed.

From this dataset, I can compare inventor attention to certain invention terms in the presence or absence of discussion of property rights. Inventor attention to “licensed” and “unlicensed” rights is studied independently in this binary logit model. Further investigation can explore the interaction effects between the two property rights terms.

Table 4 Results summary

	Odds Ratios		
	<i>Interference</i>	<i>filter</i>	<i>sensor</i>
Odds with <i>licensed</i> term (“licensed” = 1) than without <i>licensed</i> term (“licensed” = 0)	1.27	0.97	0.78
Odds with <i>unlicensed</i> term (“unlicensed” = 1) than without <i>unlicensed</i> term (“unlicensed” = 0)	1.55	0.76	1.40

Table 4 summarizes the odds ratios of the property rights terms that are regressed onto invention terms. I find that inventors who discuss “licensed” rights are 1.27 times as likely to discuss “interference,” than inventors who do not discuss “licensed” rights. Inventors who discuss “unlicensed” rights are 1.55 times as likely to discuss “interference,” than are inventors who do not discuss “unlicensed” rights. This result is similar for the “sensor” term, where inventors who discuss “unlicensed” rights are 1.40 times as likely to discuss “sensors” than are inventors who do not discuss “unlicensed” rights.

Inventor attention to “filter” technology shows the opposite result, however. Inventors who discuss “licensed” rights are 0.97 times as likely to discuss “filter” technology than are inventors who do not discuss “licensed” rights. Inventors who discuss “unlicensed” rights are 0.76 times as likely to discuss “filter” technology than are those who do not discuss

“unlicensed” rights. Inventors who invent filters appear relatively less concerned with property rights. Possible reasons are discussed further below.

5.1 “Interference” Results

Equation (2) presents model estimates for the odds that an inventor who discusses “licensed” or “unlicensed” terms will discuss “interference” more than does an inventor who does not discuss “licensed” or “unlicensed” rights. Table 5 shows results that include policy, technology, or general terms. Column (4) includes results that are displayed in Eq. (2).

In Table 5, the odds ratio of inventors who have a concern about “interference” is 1.27 = $e^{0.24}$ for a unit increase in the “licensed” term. Inventors who discuss “licensed” rights are 1.27 times as likely to discuss “interference” rights than are inventors who do not discuss “licensed” rights. The odds ratio of inventors who have a concern about “interference” is 1.55 = $e^{0.44}$ for a unit increase in the “unlicensed” term. Inventors who discuss “unlicensed” rights are 1.55 times as likely to discuss “interference” than are inventors who do not discuss “unlicensed” rights.

This result that inventors who discuss property rights are more concerned with “interference” than are those who do not discuss property rights holds true after including policy, technology, and general terms as control variables. Inventors in “unlicensed” bands may indeed be more concerned with “interference” issues because unlicensed (FCC Part 15) rules do not protect users from “interference.” Inventors may be solving the problem of “interference” through invention in “licensed” bands as well.

$$Prob(interference) > 0) = \Lambda(-4.47 + 0.24licensed + 0.44unlicensed + \Gamma_{it} + \Omega_{it} + \Phi_{it}) \quad (2)$$

Table 5 Logit regression: “Interference” results

	<i>interference</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OR with licensed term than without licensed term</i>	1.65	1.11	1.63	1.27	1.62	
	0.50*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.49*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.48*** (0.02)	
<i>OR with unlicensed term than without unlicensed term</i>	2.92	1.70	2.66	1.55		1.93
	1.07*** (0.03)	0.53*** (0.04)	0.98*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.04)		0.66*** (0.03)
Policy Terms	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Terms	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
General Terms	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.24*** (0.01)	-2.34*** (0.01)	-1.30*** (0.01)	-4.47*** (0.11)	-4.47*** (0.11)	-4.47*** (0.11)
Observations	499,816	499,816	499,816	499,813	499,813	499,813

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.




Fig. 4 “Interference” citations by firm

Figure 4 shows graphical results for inventor attention to “interference” as separated by firm and year. The firm with the most radio patents that are concerned with “interference” is Qualcomm, Inc., followed by a large category of various unaffiliated inventors, then LG Electronics, Inc., Broadcom Corp., Samsung Electronics, Intel Corp., Nokia Corp., Apple Inc., and Fujitsu Ltd. For a list of all firms with more than 500 radio patents that cite the term “interference,” see the Data Appendix.

5.2 “Filter” Results

The model shows opposite results for the “filter” term. Equation (3) shows that the odds ratio of an inventor who cites “filter” is $0.97 = e^{-0.03}$ for a unit increase in the “licensed” term. The odds ratio for an inventor who discusses “filter” technology is $0.76 = e^{-0.27}$ for a unit increase in the “unlicensed” term. Table 6 shows results that include policy, technology, and general terms. Column (4) includes results that are displayed in Eq. (3).

Inventors who discuss “licensed” rights were 0.97 times as likely to discuss “filter” technology, than were those who did not discuss “licensed” rights. This result that inventors did not seem to discuss “filters” and property rights together holds true after including policy, technology, and general terms as control variables.

Inventors of “filters” may not be concerned with property rights issues because they already have certainty in emission boundaries. Inventors who build “filters” may rely on predetermined boundaries through spectrum allocations, without the need to discuss “licensed” or “unlicensed” alternatives. Further investigation is needed to consider inventors of “filter” technologies and their comparative lack of attention to property rights.

$$Prob(filter) > 0) = \Lambda(-4.48 - 0.03licensed - 0.27unlicensed + \Gamma_{it} + \Omega_{it} + \Phi_{it}) \quad (3)$$

Table 6 Logit regression: “Filter” results

	<i>filter</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OR</i> with <i>licensed</i> term than without <i>licensed</i> term	1.62	1.04	1.52	0.97	0.84	
	0.48*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.42*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.02)	
<i>OR</i> with <i>unlicensed</i> term than without <i>unlicensed</i> term	1.14	0.75	1.08	0.76		0.73
	0.13*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.27*** (0.04)		-0.31*** (0.03)
Policy Terms	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Terms	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
General Terms	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.57*** (0.01)	-1.48*** (0.01)	-0.63*** (0.01)	-4.48*** (0.10)	-4.48*** (0.10)	-4.48*** (0.10)
Observations	499,816	499,816	499,816	499,813	499,813	499,813

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.




Fig. 5 “Filter” citations by firm

Figure 5 shows graphical results for inventor attention to “filter” technologies as separated by firm and year. The firm with the most radio patents concerned with “filters” is Qualcomm, Inc., followed by various unaffiliated inventors, Broadcom Corp., LG Electronics Inc., Blackberry Ltd., Sony Corp., Research In Motion, Samsung Electronics, and Apple Inc. For a list of all firms with more than 500 radio patents that cite the term “filter,” see the Data Appendix.

5.3 “Sensor” Results

The model shows that results for the “sensor” term are similar to those of the “interference” term. Equation (4) shows that inventors who discuss “unlicensed” rights are as likely to discuss “sensor” technology than are inventors who do not discuss “unlicensed” rights, with an odds ratio of $1.40 = e^{0.34}$. Compared to inventors who do not discuss “licensed” rights, inventors who discuss “licensed” rights discuss “sensor” technology with an odds ratio of $0.78 = e^{-0.25}$. Table 7 shows results that include policy, technology, and general terms. Column (4) includes results that are displayed in Eq. (4).

Inventors who discuss “unlicensed” rights are 1.40 times as likely to discuss “sensor” technology than are those who do not discuss “unlicensed” rights. This result holds true after including policy, technology, and general terms as control variables. Inventors in “unlicensed” bands may be relying on “unlicensed” policies to build low-power devices. An increase in radio patents that cite the term “sensor” has been increasing over the years, but the number of patents that cite “unlicensed” rights has not increased much over the years and remains smaller than “licensed” rights. Further investigation of patents for “sensors” may be able to explain these wireless technology trends.

$$Prob(sensor) > 0) = \Lambda(-4.67 - 0.25licensed + 0.34unlicensed + \Gamma_{it} + \Omega_{it} + \Phi_{it}) \quad (4)$$

Table 7 Logit regression: “Sensor” results

	<i>sensor</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>OR</i> with <i>licensed</i> term than without <i>licensed</i> term	1.06	0.88	0.90	0.78	0.92	
	0.06** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)	
<i>OR</i> with <i>unlicensed</i> term than without <i>unlicensed</i> term	1.11	1.32	1.21	1.40		1.11
	0.10*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.04)		0.10*** (0.03)
Policy Terms	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Technology Terms	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
General Terms	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.12*** (0.01)	-1.63*** (0.01)	-1.17*** (0.01)	-4.67*** (0.10)	-4.67*** (0.10)	-4.67*** (0.10)
Observations	499,816	499,816	499,816	499,813	499,813	499,813

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.




Fig. 6 “Sensor” citations by firm

Figure 6 shows graphical results for inventor attention to “sensor” technologies as separated by firm and year. The most radio patents concerned with “sensors” were filed by various inventors, then Google Inc., IBM Corp., Apple Inc., Qualcomm Inc., LG Electronics Inc., Samsung Electronics, Sony Corp., and Intel Corp. For a list of all firms with more than 500 radio patents that cite the term “sensor,” see the Data Appendix.

5.4 Policy Terms

Table 8 shows model estimates for a vector of other policy terms as independent variables. Estimates for property rights terms “licensed” and “unlicensed” appear as they have been reported earlier in Tables 5, 6, and 7.

Table 8 Logit regression: Policy terms

	(1) <i>interference</i>	(2) <i>filter</i>	(3) <i>sensor</i>
<i>licensed</i>	0.10*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.03)
<i>unlicensed</i>	0.53*** (0.04)	-0.29*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)
<i>harmful</i>	0.19*** (0.02)	0.50*** (0.02)	0.45*** (0.02)
<i>property</i>	0.02** (0.01)	0.40*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)
<i>rights</i>	-0.45*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)
<i>band</i>	0.90*** (0.01)	0.89*** (0.01)	-0.25*** (0.01)
<i>allocation</i>	0.65*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.67*** (0.01)
<i>adjacent</i>	0.64*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)	0.56*** (0.01)
<i>cancellation</i>	0.97*** (0.02)	0.83*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)
<i>collocation</i>	0.39*** (0.11)	0.31*** (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)
<i>monitoring</i>	0.09*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)	1.23*** (0.01)
<i>enforcement</i>	-0.49*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.02)
<i>CFR</i>	-0.11*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
<i>FCC</i>	0.49*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
<i>spectrum</i>	0.90*** (0.01)	0.89*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Constant	-2.34***	-1.48***	-1.63***

	<i>(0.01)</i>	<i>(0.01)</i>	<i>(0.01)</i>
Observations	499,816	499,816	499,816

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

These results show that terms such as “band,” “cancellation,” “collocation,” “allocation,” and “spectrum,” are more likely to be cited in patents that also discuss property rights such as “licensed” or “unlicensed” rights than in patents that do not discuss property rights. Further investigation of phrases, such as “harmful interference,” rather than the singular term “harmful” could reveal additional insights into inventor attention to interference.

Policy terms -- such as “CFR” for the Code of Federal Regulations, and “FCC” for the Federal Communications Commission -- were extracted as well. The Data Appendix includes model estimates for general terms such as “1927” and “1996,” which may point to inventor attention to legislation such as the Radio Act of 1927 or the Communications Act of 1996. This novel dataset allows for further study of inventor attention to other matters of spectrum policy.

6 Conclusion

This article presents a novel dataset for textual analysis of radio patents. With a binary choice logit model, I generate odds ratios that provide estimates of inventor attention to property rights and policy terms. Such empirical findings can reveal the effects of property rights on innovation. If inventors respond to policy conditions with more productive output, evidence of inventor activity may be seen in patent claims.

I find that certain invention terms -- such as “interference” and “sensor” -- appear more frequently in patents that also contained the terms “licensed” and “unlicensed” than in patents that did not mention those property rights terms. These empirical findings suggest that inventors of radio “fences” pay attention to property rights.

In future studies, the causal effect of property rights on invention can be further confirmed using this dataset after applying more sophisticated classification methods that extract natural language meaning from patent text.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the Ronald Coase Institute Workshop on Institutional Analysis and the Ostrom Workshop of Indiana University Bloomington for the opportunity to present this paper in Bogota, Colombia in December 2017. The author appreciates comments from Scott Wallsten, Thomas Lenard, Mary Shirley, Michael Wiebe, and Thomas Hazlett. No funding or financial support was received for this paper.

References

- Bergeaud, A., Potiron, Y., & Rimbault, J. (2017). Classifying patents based on their semantic content. *PLoS ONE*, 12(4), e0176310, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176310>.
- Carter, K., Lahjouji, A., & McNeil, N. (2003) Unlicensed and unshackled: A joint OSP-OET white paper on unlicensed devices and their regulatory issues. Federal Communications Commission, Office of Strategic Plan. & Policy, Working Paper No. 39, 13–21, https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-234741A1.pdf.
- Coase, R. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 2, 1-40.
- Daim, T., Rueda, G., Martin, H., & Gerdri, P. (2006). Forecasting emerging technologies: Use of bibliometrics and patent analysis. *Technological Forecasting & Social Change*, 73, 981-1012.
- Greene, W.H. (2008). *Econometric analysis*. Sixth Edition. Chapter 23, Models for discrete choice. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
- Hazlett, T. (1998). Assigning property rights to radio spectrum users: Why did FCC license auctions take 76 years? *Journal of Law and Economics*, 41, 529-76.
- Hazlett, T., & Honig, M. (2016). Valuing spectrum allocations. *Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review*, 23, 45-111.
- Lerner, J., & Seru, A. (2015). The use and misuse of patent data: Issues for corporate finance and beyond. Booth / Harvard Business School Working Paper. <http://socialsciences.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/The-Use-and-Misuse-of-Patent-Data.pdf>.
- O'Connor, S. M. (2015). Creators, innovators, and appropriation mechanisms. *George Mason Law Review*, 22(4), 973-1000.
- Tseng, Y-H., Lin, C-J., & Lin, Y-I. (2007). Text mining techniques for patent analysis.

Information Processing and Management, 43, 1216-1247.

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. (2017). Patent full-text and image database, <http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%2Fnethtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-adv.htm&r=0&p=1&f=S&l=50&Query=rner=PALL>.

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. (2017). U.S. patent statistics chart calendar years 1963 - 2015, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.

Data Appendix

Table A1 Descriptive statistics

<i>Variable</i>	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Firm</i> ⁸	499,964	23,126	11,978	1	45,606
<i>Year</i> ⁹	499,852	267	168	1	451
<i>1927</i>	500,000	0.02	0.14	0	1
<i>1996</i>	500,000	0.39	0.49	0	1
<i>AC</i>	500,000	0.96	0.20	0	1
<i>adjacent</i>	500,000	0.31	0.46	0	1
<i>allocation</i>	500,000	0.13	0.33	0	1
<i>AM</i>	500,000	0.54	0.50	0	1
<i>analog</i>	500,000	0.37	0.48	0	1
<i>antenna</i>	500,000	0.39	0.49	0	1
<i>auction</i>	500,000	0.01	0.10	0	1
<i>band</i>	500,000	0.54	0.50	0	1
<i>base</i>	499,997	0.90	0.29	0	1
<i>bluetooth</i>	500,000	0.01	0.09	0	1
<i>broadcast</i>	499,997	0.22	0.42	0	1
<i>cancellation</i>	500,000	0.04	0.20	0	1
<i>carrier</i>	500,000	0.36	0.48	0	1
<i>CDMA</i>	500,000	0.18	0.38	0	1
<i>cell</i>	500,000	0.58	0.49	0	1
<i>cellular</i>	500,000	0.35	0.48	0	1
<i>CFR</i>	500,000	0.02	0.13	0	1
<i>channel</i>	500,000	0.49	0.50	0	1
<i>CINR</i>	500,000	0.00	0.05	0	1
<i>coaxial</i>	500,000	0.11	0.32	0	1
<i>code</i>	500,000	0.62	0.48	0	1
<i>collocation</i>	500,000	0.00	0.03	0	1
<i>computer</i>	500,000	0.65	0.48	0	1
<i>consumer</i>	500,000	0.13	0.33	0	1
<i>current</i>	500,000	0.73	0.45	0	1
<i>database</i>	500,000	0.27	0.45	0	1
<i>DC</i>	500,000	0.28	0.45	0	1
<i>digital</i>	500,000	0.60	0.49	0	1
<i>downlink</i>	500,000	0.09	0.29	0	1
<i>edge</i>	499,997	0.42	0.49	0	1
<i>electromagnetic</i>	500,000	0.22	0.42	0	1
<i>enforcement</i>	500,000	0.03	0.16	0	1
<i>error</i>	500,000	0.36	0.48	0	1

⁸ Firms are identified with numbers between 1 and 45,606.

⁹ Years are coded in Stata 12.0, ranging from 1976 to 2016. Note: Key term extraction counted terms in the presence of a plural “s” or not. Several terms were counted with different spellings. Cancellation includes “cancellation” or “cancelation,” CFR includes “CFR,” “C.F.R.,” or “Code of Federal,” FCC includes “Federal Communications Commission” or “FCC,” TV includes “television” or “TV,” white space includes “white spaces” or “white space,” WiFi includes “Wi-Fi” or “WiFi,” and 3G includes “3G” or “3GPP.”

<i>FCC</i>	500,000	0.03	0.16	0	1
<i>FDMA</i>	500,000	0.06	0.23	0	1
<i>federal</i>	500,000	0.01	0.09	0	1
<i>fiber</i>	500,000	0.22	0.41	0	1
<i>filter</i>	500,000	0.36	0.48	0	1
<i>5G</i>	500,000	0.03	0.18	0	1
<i>fixed</i>	500,000	0.47	0.50	0	1
<i>FM</i>	500,000	0.07	0.26	0	1
<i>4G</i>	500,000	0.05	0.23	0	1
<i>frequency</i>	500,000	0.72	0.45	0	1
<i>GHz</i>	500,000	0.11	0.31	0	1
<i>gigahertz</i>	500,000	0.01	0.10	0	1
<i>GPS</i>	500,000	0.16	0.36	0	1
<i>ground</i>	500,000	0.37	0.48	0	1
<i>GSM</i>	500,000	0.16	0.36	0	1
<i>handover</i>	499,997	0.04	0.20	0	1
<i>harmful</i>	500,000	0.02	0.15	0	1
<i>HD</i>	500,000	0.10	0.30	0	1
<i>hertz</i>	500,000	0.04	0.20	0	1
<i>high</i>	500,000	0.83	0.38	0	1
<i>Hz</i>	500,000	0.28	0.45	0	1
<i>IEEE</i>	500,000	0.32	0.46	0	1
<i>industrial</i>	500,000	0.06	0.24	0	1
<i>infrared</i>	500,000	0.23	0.42	0	1
<i>interference</i>	500,000	0.23	0.42	0	1
<i>internet</i>	500,000	0.13	0.34	0	1
<i>kHz</i>	500,000	0.07	0.26	0	1
<i>kilohertz</i>	500,000	0.01	0.10	0	1
<i>Kv</i>	500,000	0.01	0.09	0	1
<i>laser</i>	500,000	0.14	0.35	0	1
<i>legal</i>	500,000	0.06	0.23	0	1
<i>licensed</i>	500,000	0.03	0.18	0	1
<i>load</i>	499,997	0.55	0.5	0	1
<i>low</i>	500,000	0.99	0.11	0	1
<i>LTE</i>	500,000	0.10	0.30	0	1
<i>market</i>	500,000	0.13	0.34	0	1
<i>medical</i>	500,000	0.13	0.34	0	1
<i>megahertz</i>	500,000	0.02	0.13	0	1
<i>MHz</i>	500,000	0.17	0.38	0	1
<i>microphone</i>	499,997	0.18	0.38	0	1
<i>microwave</i>	500,000	0.12	0.32	0	1
<i>millisecond</i>	500,000	0.06	0.25	0	1
<i>MIMO</i>	500,000	0.04	0.20	0	1
<i>mobile</i>	500,000	0.48	0.50	0	1
<i>monitoring</i>	500,000	0.27	0.44	0	1
<i>multiplex</i>	499,997	0.17	0.38	0	1
<i>OFDMA</i>	500,000	0.03	0.18	0	1

<i>ohms</i>	500,000	0.02	0.15	0	1
<i>PCS</i>	500,000	0.04	0.21	0	1
<i>positioning</i>	500,000	0.21	0.41	0	1
<i>power</i>	500,000	0.65	0.48	0	1
<i>processor</i>	500,000	0.60	0.49	0	1
<i>property</i>	500,000	0.13	0.34	0	1
<i>radar</i>	500,000	0.04	0.19	0	1
<i>receiver</i>	500,000	0.44	0.50	0	1
<i>regulatory</i>	500,000	0.04	0.20	0	1
<i>relay</i>	500,000	0.13	0.34	0	1
<i>resistor</i>	500,000	0.09	0.28	0	1
<i>retail</i>	500,000	0.05	0.21	0	1
<i>RF</i>	500,000	0.50	0.50	0	1
<i>rights</i>	500,000	0.07	0.26	0	1
<i>RSSI</i>	500,000	0.02	0.15	0	1
<i>satellite</i>	500,000	0.20	0.40	0	1
<i>sensor</i>	500,000	0.31	0.46	0	1
<i>shared</i>	500,000	0.20	0.40	0	1
<i>signal</i>	500,000	0.84	0.36	0	1
<i>spectrum</i>	500,000	0.19	0.39	0	1
<i>station</i>	499,997	0.49	0.5	0	1
<i>TDMA</i>	500,000	0.09	0.29	0	1
<i>telephone</i>	500,000	0.34	0.47	0	1
<i>terrestrial</i>	500,000	0.05	0.22	0	1
<i>3G</i>	500,000	0.16	0.37	0	1
<i>threshold</i>	500,000	0.29	0.46	0	1
<i>tower</i>	500,000	0.05	0.21	0	1
<i>transceiver</i>	500,000	0.24	0.43	0	1
<i>transmitter</i>	500,000	0.35	0.48	0	1
<i>TV</i>	500,000	0.21	0.41	0	1
<i>UMTS</i>	500,000	0.09	0.29	0	1
<i>unlicensed</i>	500,000	0.02	0.13	0	1
<i>uplink</i>	500,000	0.09	0.29	0	1
<i>v</i>	500,000	0.97	0.17	0	1
<i>volts</i>	500,000	0.05	0.22	0	1
<i>wave</i>	500,000	0.50	0.50	0	1
<i>WCDMA</i>	500,000	0.05	0.22	0	1
<i>white space</i>	500,000	0.00	0.06	0	1
<i>WiFi</i>	500,000	0.12	0.33	0	1
<i>WiMax</i>	500,000	0.03	0.16	0	1
<i>wireless</i>	500,000	0.57	0.49	0	1
<i>xray</i>	500,000	0.00	0.02	0	1

Table A2 Mean value of key terms in year's patents (sorted by 2016)

Terms	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<i>low</i>	0.99	0.93	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.98	0.97	0.97
<i>AC</i>	0.96	0.90	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.95	0.96
<i>v</i>	0.98	0.91	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.95
<i>base</i>	0.91	0.86	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.94
<i>signal</i>	0.84	0.79	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.89
<i>current</i>	0.73	0.69	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.82
<i>high</i>	0.83	0.78	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.81
<i>computer</i>	0.64	0.62	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.71	0.74	0.76	0.77	0.76	0.81
<i>processor</i>	0.58	0.57	0.64	0.64	0.67	0.69	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.81
<i>wireless</i>	0.58	0.56	0.64	0.64	0.66	0.68	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.78
<i>code</i>	0.62	0.60	0.65	0.64	0.66	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.76
<i>digital</i>	0.59	0.57	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.64	0.66	0.67	0.69	0.70	0.75
<i>AM</i>	0.52	0.51	0.55	0.56	0.59	0.60	0.62	0.64	0.66	0.66	0.72
<i>load</i>	0.55	0.53	0.56	0.57	0.59	0.60	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.70
<i>wave</i>	0.49	0.47	0.51	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.54	0.56	0.64
<i>frequency</i>	0.71	0.68	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.71	0.63
<i>cell</i>	0.57	0.55	0.59	0.61	0.62	0.64	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.63
<i>power</i>	0.65	0.61	0.65	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.62
<i>mobile</i>	0.45	0.44	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.56	0.59	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.57
<i>edge</i>	0.42	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.47	0.48	0.57
<i>band</i>	0.54	0.51	0.56	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.56	0.52
<i>RF</i>	0.52	0.49	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.55	0.54	0.46
<i>station</i>	0.47	0.46	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.52	0.50	0.49	0.46
<i>fixed</i>	0.47	0.44	0.47	0.48	0.48	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.45
<i>channel</i>	0.48	0.46	0.50	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.50	0.49	0.44
<i>fiber</i>	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.30	0.43
<i>database</i>	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.35	0.42
<i>cellular</i>	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.40	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42
<i>electromagnetic</i>	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.28	0.30	0.41
<i>sensor</i>	0.30	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.33	0.35	0.37	0.40	0.41	0.42	0.41
<i>receiver</i>	0.44	0.41	0.46	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.41
<i>threshold</i>	0.28	0.27	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.33	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.39
<i>IEEE</i>	0.33	0.32	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.37	0.37	0.36
<i>ground</i>	0.38	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.35
<i>error</i>	0.36	0.35	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.34
<i>analog</i>	0.37	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.36	0.36	0.34
<i>antenna</i>	0.39	0.37	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.41	0.40	0.40	0.34
<i>telephone</i>	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.34
<i>filter</i>	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.33
<i>carrier</i>	0.36	0.35	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.39	0.37	0.33
<i>transmitter</i>	0.35	0.33	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.33	0.29
<i>Wi-Fi</i>	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.20	0.24	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.29
<i>monitoring</i>	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29
<i>adjacent</i>	0.31	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.29

<i>shared</i>	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.27
<i>DC</i>	0.28	0.26	0.27	0.28	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.27
<i>transceiver</i>	0.22	0.22	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.27
<i>infrared</i>	0.22	0.22	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.26
<i>GPS</i>	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.26
<i>microphone</i>	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.20	0.21	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.26
<i>market</i>	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.26
<i>Hz</i>	0.29	0.26	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.26	0.24
<i>TV</i>	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.24
<i>positioning</i>	0.20	0.19	0.21	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.24
<i>1996</i>	0.41	0.35	0.32	0.31	0.30	0.27	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.22
<i>3G</i>	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.20	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.22
<i>satellite</i>	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.21
<i>broadcast</i>	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.21
<i>LTE</i>	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.20
<i>interference</i>	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.19
<i>internet</i>	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19
<i>CDMA</i>	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.18
<i>GSM</i>	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.18
<i>consumer</i>	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.18
<i>allocation</i>	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.17
<i>spectrum</i>	0.19	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.17
<i>laser</i>	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
<i>property</i>	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.16
<i>4G</i>	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.15
<i>multiplex</i>	0.16	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.15
<i>medical</i>	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
<i>MHz</i>	0.18	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.14
<i>HD</i>	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.14
<i>relay</i>	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.14
<i>UMTS</i>	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.11
<i>coaxial</i>	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.11
<i>microwave</i>	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.11
<i>downlink</i>	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.10
<i>rights</i>	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09
<i>GHz</i>	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.09
<i>TDMA</i>	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09
<i>uplink</i>	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.09
<i>resistor</i>	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09
<i>legal</i>	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08
<i>FDMA</i>	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07
<i>tower</i>	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
<i>industrial</i>	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
<i>WCDMA</i>	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.06
<i>FM</i>	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
<i>kHz</i>	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06
<i>MIMO</i>	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06

<i>retail</i>	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
<i>millisecond</i>	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06
<i>5G</i>	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
<i>OFDMA</i>	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05
<i>WiMax</i>	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
<i>terrestrial</i>	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05
<i>radar</i>	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
<i>enforcement</i>	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
<i>handover</i>	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.04
<i>cancellation</i>	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04
<i>licensed</i>	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
<i>regulatory</i>	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
<i>CFR</i>	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
<i>volts</i>	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03
<i>hertz</i>	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03
<i>RSSI</i>	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03
<i>PCS</i>	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03
<i>FCC</i>	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
<i>1927</i>	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03
<i>unlicensed</i>	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
<i>harmful</i>	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
<i>ohms</i>	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
<i>federal</i>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>gigahertz</i>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>bluetooth</i>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>megahertz</i>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
<i>auction</i>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>Kv</i>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>kilohertz</i>	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>white space</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
<i>CINR</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<i>collocation</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<i>xray</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: Author's calculations, sorted by year 2016. USPTO Full-Text Database (2017).

Table A3 Logit regression: Technology terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>interference</i>	<i>filter</i>	<i>sensor</i>
<i>licensed</i>	0.49*** (0.03)	0.42*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)
<i>unlicensed</i>	0.98*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)
<i>3G</i>	0.13*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.68*** (0.01)
<i>4G</i>	-0.08*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.01)	0.40*** (0.02)
<i>5G</i>	0.11*** (0.02)	0.61*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.02)
<i>LTE</i>	0.29*** (0.01)	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.29*** (0.01)
<i>WiMax</i>	-0.23*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
<i>WiFi</i>	-0.26*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.52*** (0.01)
<i>GPS</i>	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	1.21*** (0.01)
<i>CDMA</i>	0.66*** (0.01)	0.34*** (0.01)	-0.57*** (0.01)
<i>MIMO</i>	1.61*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.02)	-0.75*** (0.02)
Constant	-1.30*** (0.01)	-0.63*** (0.01)	-1.17*** (0.01)
Observations	499,816	499,816	499,816

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A4 Logit regression: All terms

	(1) <i>interferen ce</i>	(2) <i>filter</i>	(3) <i>sensor</i>
<i>licensed</i>	0.24*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)
<i>unlicensed</i>	0.44*** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.04)	0.34*** (0.04)
<i>3G</i>	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.41*** (0.01)
<i>4G</i>	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)
<i>5G</i>	0.01 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)
<i>LTE</i>	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
<i>WiMax</i>	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
<i>WiFi</i>	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)
<i>GPS</i>	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.01)	0.93*** (0.01)
<i>CDMA</i>	0.23*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.02)
<i>MIMO</i>	0.47*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.03)
<i>spectrum</i>	0.51*** (0.01)	0.52*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)
<i>allocation</i>	0.17*** (0.01)	-0.27*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)
<i>band</i>	0.28*** (0.01)	0.49*** (0.01)	-0.32*** (0.01)
<i>cancellation</i>	0.69*** (0.02)	0.57*** (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.02)
<i>CFR</i>	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
<i>FCC</i>	0.29*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.02)
<i>adjacent</i>	0.43*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.01)
<i>collocation</i>	0.43*** (0.12)	0.39*** (0.11)	-0.07 (0.12)
<i>harmful</i>	0.18*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.02)
<i>monitoring</i>	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.88*** (0.01)
<i>enforcement</i>	-0.22*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
<i>property</i>	0.00 (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
<i>rights</i>	-0.10***	0.03**	-0.02

	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
1927	0.13***	0.12***	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
1996	0.01	0.05***	0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AC	0.00	-0.09***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AM	-0.18***	0.12***	-0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
analog	0.02**	0.63***	0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
antenna	0.29***	0.02**	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
auction	-0.06	0.13***	-0.16***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
base	0.01	0.23***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
bluetooth	0.26***	-0.28***	0.45***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
broadcast	0.09***	-0.14***	-0.26***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
carrier	0.20***	0.14***	-0.23***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
cell	0.05***	-0.01	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
cellular	0.11***	0.20***	-0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
channel	0.38***	0.10***	-0.25***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
CINR	1.31***	-0.78***	-0.80***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.14)
coaxial	0.01	-0.08***	-0.30***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
code	-0.04***	-0.06***	-0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
computer	-0.13***	-0.14***	0.28***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
consumer	-0.01	0.01	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
current	-0.16***	-0.03***	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
database	-0.36***	0.11***	-0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
DC	-0.06***	0.36***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
digital	-0.05***	0.22***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
downlink	0.41***	-0.24***	-0.32***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
edge	0.18***	0.04***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

<i>electromagnetic</i>	0.46*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)
<i>error</i>	0.35*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
<i>FDMA</i>	0.20*** (0.03)	-0.26*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
<i>federal</i>	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
<i>fiber</i>	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
<i>fixed</i>	0.12*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)
<i>FM</i>	0.10*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)
<i>frequency</i>	0.35*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
<i>GHz</i>	0.15*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.02)
<i>gigahertz</i>	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.24*** (0.04)
<i>ground</i>	0.11*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
<i>GSM</i>	-0.32*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
<i>handover</i>	0.21*** (0.02)	-0.26*** (0.02)	-0.73*** (0.03)
<i>HD</i>	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
<i>hertz</i>	0.08*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
<i>high</i>	0.20*** (0.01)	0.41*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
<i>Hz</i>	0.06*** (0.01)	0.34*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
<i>IEEE</i>	0.07*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	-0.18*** (0.01)
<i>industrial</i>	0.09*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.01)
<i>infrared</i>	-0.15*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.56*** (0.01)
<i>internet</i>	-0.19*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
<i>kHz</i>	0.07*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.02)
<i>kilohertz</i>	0.07* (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
<i>Kv</i>	0.15*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
<i>laser</i>	0.07*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)
<i>legal</i>	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.27***

	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
<i>load</i>	-0.09***	0.00	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>low</i>	1.20***	1.45***	1.37***
	(0.11)	(0.1)	(0.1)
<i>market</i>	-0.03***	0.05***	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>medical</i>	0.05***	0.17***	0.63***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>megahertz</i>	0.05	0.08**	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
<i>MHz</i>	0.04***	0.04***	-0.23***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>microphone</i>	-0.31***	0.05***	0.53***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>microwave</i>	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>millisecond</i>	0.04***	0.05***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
<i>mobile</i>	0.09***	0	-0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>multiplex</i>	0.28***	0.16***	-0.22***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>OFDMA</i>	-0.26***	0.14***	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
<i>ohms</i>	0.01	-0.11***	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>PCS</i>	-0.06***	0.11***	-0.46***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>positioning</i>	0.17***	-0.05***	0.50***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>power</i>	0.37***	-0.05***	0.53***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>processor</i>	-0.20***	0.09***	0.22***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>radar</i>	0.06***	0.11***	0.71***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>receiver</i>	0.23***	0.18***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>regulatory</i>	0.31***	0.32***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>relay</i>	0.15***	-0.13***	0.38***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>resistor</i>	0.07***	0.39***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>retail</i>	-0.11***	-0.06***	0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>RF</i>	-0.06***	0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
<i>RSSI</i>	0.68***	0.22***	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)

<i>satellite</i>	-0.21*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)
<i>shared</i>	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)
<i>signal</i>	0.34*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.65*** (0.01)
<i>station</i>	0.16*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
<i>TDMA</i>	0.19*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)
<i>telephone</i>	-0.23*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.26*** (0.01)
<i>terrestrial</i>	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
<i>threshold</i>	0.19*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.01)
<i>tower</i>	0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
<i>transceiver</i>	0.11*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)
<i>transmitter</i>	0.23*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)
<i>TV</i>	-0.09*** (0.01)	0 (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)
<i>UMTS</i>	-0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.28*** (0.02)
<i>uplink</i>	0.20*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.22*** (0.03)
<i>v</i>	-0.21*** (0.03)	0.18*** -0.03	0.03 (0.03)
<i>volts</i>	0.09*** (0.02)	(0.01) -0.02	0.22*** (0.02)
<i>wave</i>	0.03*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
<i>WCDMA</i>	-0.13*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.02)
<i>white space</i>	0.52*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)
<i>wireless</i>	0.00 (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)
<i>xray</i>	0.04 (0.18)	0.24 (0.16)	0.30* (0.17)
Constant	-4.47*** (0.11)	-4.48*** (0.10)	-4.67*** (0.10)
Observations	499,813	499,813	499,813

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A5 “Interference” citations in radio patents by firm

Firm	Total	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Qualcomm Inc.	5,709	313	345	553	692	704	582	504	543	352	115	8
Various	5,569	344	269	293	308	260	325	333	331	261	170	29
LG Electronics Inc.	3,771	77	132	266	427	532	570	534	481	328	179	31
Broadcom Corp.	2,468	199	227	162	195	203	293	206	232	72	41	3
Samsung Electronics	2,070	135	179	224	166	188	151	161	180	154	102	9
Intel Corp.	1,777	103	113	92	119	104	132	241	164	108	44	3
Nokia Corp.	1,437	133	100	107	95	78	61	20	11	1		
Apple Inc.	1,249	24	69	107	89	134	151	253	186	138	70	11
Fujitsu Ltd.	1,241	59	98	72	115	89	89	114	86	71	35	3
Sony Corp.	1,206	61	70	56	85	118	103	116	90	59	20	3
Motorola Inc.	1,114	68	24	9	2							
NEC Corp.	1,058	65	57	63	60	65	51	73	35	16	12	1
NTT Docomo Inc.	1,030	114	83	114	126	71	102	83	61	6	3	
Interdigital Technology	904	58	53	56	37	16	29	34	29	21	12	3
Panasonic Corp.	884	122	116	107	87	76	77	54	24	7	9	3
IBM Corp.	830	37	55	79	35	37	29	53	40	55	54	13
Cisco Technology Inc.	805	47	53	59	57	44	85	68	64	78	14	2
Silverbrook Research	727	32	63	117	67	59	18	3				
Lucent Technologies	699	4										
Blackberry Ltd.	691	9	15	18	33	99	113	212	131	42	13	4
Texas Instruments Inc.	688	40	58	70	40	56	39	22	23	5	3	
Matsushita Electric	642	16	2									
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba	577	28	61	46	44	35	31	35	20	14	7	
Elec. Telecom. Res. Inst.	554	30	39	59	45	80	59	68	58	31	5	2
Huawei Technologies	551	8	14	20	30	32	68	86	92	127	48	8
Siemens Aktiengesells	548	28	21	21	19	27	26	18	19	3		
Alcatel Lucent	543	59	51	53	53	62	73	71	43	24	8	
Microsoft Corp.	539	49	54	53	32	33	48	18	12	1		
Marvell International	517	20	38	60	38	45	42	73	88	50	18	1
Hitachi Ltd.	514	25	40	28	31	33	39	29	12	5		
Nortel Networks Ltd.	509	22	12	7	3	4						

Table A6 “Filter” citations in radio patents by firm

Firm	Total	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Various	8,781	522	530	442	448	456	550	585	620	469	259	56
Qualcomm Inc.	7,325	384	468	691	854	793	715	749	876	519	179	14
Broadcom Corp.	3,561	304	342	248	293	298	325	300	308	93	56	4
IBM Corp.	2,905	112	191	255	130	95	130	255	182	249	204	91
Intel Corp.	2,264	149	103	82	100	106	149	337	231	182	54	8
Samsung Electronics	2,139	165	166	137	113	151	129	165	221	189	132	8
Sony Corp.	1,938	108	109	101	137	184	160	152	133	73	28	4
Nokia Corp.	1,937	173	139	152	138	92	86	40	17	5	1	
Microsoft Corp.	1,879	224	179	99	115	124	65	24	1			
LG Electronics Inc.	1,846	99	79	126	125	236	280	240	206	152	73	8
Research In Motion	1,783	187	183	247	234	183	108					
Blackberry Ltd.	1,684	23	45	46	99	208	292	461	313	114	43	6
Apple Inc.	1,642	71	106	110	123	140	192	321	228	194	105	10
Google Inc.	1,403	27	43	38	41	83	174	346	330	176	76	19
Motorola Inc.	1,285	63	30	4	1							
Cisco Technology Inc.	1,112	88	104	63	69	79	90	73	73	74	20	1
Panasonic Corp.	1,103	155	173	144	106	103	80	49	30	12	11	1
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba	1,099	85	76	76	76	69	58	71	35	23	5	2
Silverbrook Research	1,097	42	87	185	103	109	43	3				
Fujitsu Ltd.	1,052	52	49	55	73	57	79	76	56	42	26	4
Texas Instruments Inc.	1,040	71	78	92	49	63	59	35	21	2	4	1
Matsushita Electric	834	31	4									
NEC Corp.	834	53	39	42	35	43	37	33	16	6	4	
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha	809	38	45	40	41	38	22	25	27	22	9	
Medtronic Inc.	806	70	32	101	67	34	27	35	25	15	1	
General Electric	803	35	59	51	59	68	72	72	25	24	8	2
Marvell International	760	36	60	99	69	53	65	102	96	60	25	1
Hitachi Ltd.	675	39	46	34	29	30	20	13	11	4	2	2
Infineon Technologies	675	65	75	49	26	21	20	22	18	19	9	1
AT&T Intellectual Pro	647	24	36	68	69	86	48	63	67	62	55	13
Koninklijke Philips	633	31	30	22	14	4	3	8				
Siemens Aktiengesells	630	31	24	26	26	36	37	34	39	6	1	
Lucent Technologies	592	3										
Interdigital Technology	557	32	26	37	27	11	14	17	14	9	8	1
Honeywell International	550	44	44	43	30	37	35	27	23	21	7	
Sprint Communications	533	21	27	29	59	86	61	52	91	40	16	3
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha	529	35	30	41	57	35	51	46	29	23	12	2
Raytheon Company	517	10	21	30	43	55	36	42	35	28	9	2
Cardiac Pacemakers	508	37	23	24	50	45	41	35	31	20	6	1
Harris Corp.	504	50	71	42	31	17	24	26	23	11	5	2

Table A7 “Sensor” citations in radio patents by firm

Firm	Total	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Various	11,512	666	637	549	611	603	765	803	878	738	398	91
Google Inc.	3,035	13	70	65	85	173	450	758	690	460	214	43
IBM Corp.	2,176	89	138	241	82	81	99	191	138	206	223	88
Apple Inc.	2,141	49	118	181	166	256	244	414	304	242	119	12
Qualcomm Inc.	2,036	68	105	90	149	179	229	338	372	289	113	14
LG Electronics Inc.	1,958	91	232	287	336	334	272	185	86	9		
Samsung Electronics	1,776	71	85	81	81	118	168	207	330	292	154	13
Sony Corp.	1,444	64	71	99	91	126	146	170	137	127	53	11
Intel Corp.	1,366	48	37	34	33	30	130	317	284	170	59	7
Medtronic Inc.	1,260	101	99	58	126	85	53	52	56	39	17	1
Silverbrook Research	1,144	53	93	195	110	110	43	5				
Microsoft Corp.	1,112	109	121	118	65	92	114	72	25	3		
General Electric Comp.	1,075	44	64	94	96	127	151	108	57	52	17	3
Honeywell International	1,059	86	87	127	88	76	65	51	64	53	19	
Blackberry Ltd.	984	6	19	22	54	117	180	288	194	71	26	6
IGT	970	102	114	67	41	26	120	151	173	41	50	8
Cardiac Pacemakers	878	84	82	71	77	65	38	12	5			
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha	837	55	47	44	49	46	41	57	52	50	16	
Nokia Corp.	830	72	70	90	102	105	88	47	15	3	1	
The Boeing Company	769	55	56	64	63	74	68	68	82	32	17	2
Denso Corp.	716	73	83	52	48	26	29	43	42	21	11	
AT&T Intellectual Pro	708	25	25	59	86	82	73	88	83	79	71	9
Cisco Technology Inc.	689	62	54	31	33	55	100	79	63	87	13	
Broadcom Corp.	665	43	42	66	52	57	83	68	88	50	22	1
Microsoft Technology	645	7	9	7	38	96	164	141	124	47	8	
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba	640	50	62	41	41	39	33	46	34	15	10	1
Semiconductor Energy	627	58	52	38	42	43	51	37	85	76	54	12
Amazon Technologies	592	7	8	15	4	50	60	108	113	159	51	9
Applied Materials Inc.	583	25	25	16	19	32	23	24	29	33	8	2
Hitachi Ltd.	576	42	51	29	29	32	22	17	9	3	3	
Hewlett-Packard Dev.	562	21	30	28	26	36	28	18	8	1	2	
Fujitsu Ltd.	542	25	27	27	38	44	49	63	44	45	21	1
Covidien LP	516	9	14	32	51	58	87	105	90	39	24	6