Comments filed with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration on “Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy”

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The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is requesting comments on a proposed approach to consumer privacy “that lays out a set of user-centric privacy outcomes that underpin the protections that should be produced by any Federal actions on consumer-privacy policy, and a set of high-level goals that describe the outlines of the ecosystem that should be created to provide those protections.”\(^1\) The purpose of the Request for Comments (RFC) is to generate policies “for this Administration to provide the leadership needed to ensure that the United States remains at the forefront of enabling innovation with strong privacy protections”\(^2\) at a time when “[a] growing number of foreign countries, and some U.S. states, have articulated distinct visions for how to address privacy concerns, leading to a nationally and globally fragmented regulatory landscape.”\(^3\) The RFC states, “[t]he Administration hopes to articulate a renewed vision, one that reduces fragmentation nationally and increases harmonization and interoperability nationally and globally.”\(^4\)

**Summary of Major Points**

The major points of these comments are as follows:

- Collecting and analyzing large amounts of data is the basis of much, if not most, of the innovation that has taken place on the internet over the past 20 years. One recent paper conservatively estimates the benefits of content provided by advertising-supported platforms, such as Google and Facebook, at $1 trillion a year. While these platforms have suffered well-publicized data breaches, systematic evidence of privacy-related harms even from these episodes is difficult to find.

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\(^1\) 83 Fed. Reg. 48600, 48600 (Sept. 26, 2018).
\(^2\) Id.
\(^3\) Id.
\(^4\) Id.
• Many of the benefits from data are realized when data are reused, combined with other data sets, and used to answer new questions that were not anticipated at the time the data were collected. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) restrict these practices.

• Markets appear to work. Consumers willingly exchange some personal information for the resulting benefits despite what they say in many surveys. Firms suffer large financial repercussions when they experience data breaches, creating an incentive to avoid them. These factors are inconsistent with the notion that the market for privacy is subject to serious market failure.

• Any new proposal the Administration advances should yield net benefits relative to the current Federal Trade Commission (FTC) approach, which is the relevant baseline. The FTC approach is *ex post* enforcement based on actual harms. In contrast, the GDPR and CCPA use an *ex ante* regulatory approach that limits the collection, use, sharing, and retention of data in an attempt to protect consumers from hypothetical harms.

• The NTIA proposes to focus on outcomes, rather than dictate specific practices. The relevant outcome should be a reduction in privacy harms to consumers. However, what the NTIA calls outcomes—transparency, access, and control—are actually inputs, which implies dictating how firms operate, which the RFC says the NTIA does not want to do. The NTIA does not explain how it expects these inputs to produce privacy benefits—i.e., reduce privacy harms.

• Theory and evidence suggest that privacy regulations favor large incumbents and make entry by new firms more difficult. Indeed, thus far companies like Google and Facebook appear to be benefiting from GDPR. Smaller companies are dropping out of the European market to avoid these costs and the risk of large fines for noncompliance.

• Preempting state privacy laws is likely to yield benefits because the affected markets are national in scope, but only if a national law is significantly better—i.e., places fewer restrictions on the use of information—than the CCPA.

• The FTC’s current *ex post* enforcement approach based on actual harms has many advantages relative to the *ex ante* regulatory approach reflected in the GDPR and CCPA. Abandoning the current *ex post* approach would likely entail substantial costs to consumers and producers of digital goods and services.
The Value of Information

The information technology revolution includes collecting, storing, and analyzing massive amounts of data at relatively low cost. This data revolution is behind much if not most of the innovation that has taken place on the internet over the past 20 years and is integral to current developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning.

“Attention platforms,” such as Google and Facebook, are a principal target of privacy regulations, such as the recently enacted European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). These platforms have suffered well-publicized data breaches. Despite these breaches, however, systematic evidence of privacy-related harms is difficult to find. Asserting that collecting information or sharing information with third parties is harmful per se does not make it true.

While harms appear minimal, the benefits of these platforms are large. In the language of economists, they solve an important transaction cost problem by acting as an intermediary between consumers and marketers. Consumers benefit because of the content they receive—e.g., access to a search engine. Production of this content is possible because the marketers are able to collect data and deliver advertising messages to consumers when they are spending time on (i.e., devoting attention to) the platform. Better data produce better targeted advertising, which yields better information to consumers and increases the revenues available to platforms to invest in content that is often provided to consumers free of charge. Even using conservative estimates of the value of time, Evans estimates the economic value contributed by these platforms is enormous, in excess of $1 trillion a year in the United States.

Customer data are also used to develop new products and services that consumers value. Netflix, for example, uses viewing data to inform its development of original content. Data can also be used to improve algorithms and protect against security threats, and notify buyers of a product of important recalls.

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7 Id.
As the use of large data sets for artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other purposes has become more common, the value of online data is increasing. The Obama Administration’s President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) noted in a report on big data that “[t]he beneficial uses of near-ubiquitous data collection are large, and they fuel an increasingly important set of economic activities.” The World Economic Forum noted that data can be used to make financial services more inclusive, improve education, expand health coverage, and improve agricultural productivity. The McKinsey Global Institute described additional potential benefits in health care, government services, fraud protection, retailing, and manufacturing. A 2014 White House report on big data observed that “properly implemented, big data will become an historic driver of progress.”

Many of these benefits are realized when data can be reused, combined with other data sets, and used to answer new questions that were not anticipated at the time the data were collected. Innovations often come from using multiple sources of data, which may include transferring data to third parties. That approach can enhance the value of data for purposes ranging from epidemiology studies to marketing. Eliminating the “option value” of future use and serendipitous results makes data less valuable.

**The Assumption of Market Failure**

Proposals for new privacy regulation assume that the market doesn’t adequately reflect consumers’ privacy preferences and that firms do not have sufficient incentives to respond to consumers’ preferences. The experience of both consumers and businesses in the market does not support these conclusions.

The market provides information on how consumers evaluate the tradeoffs involved in sharing information and how much they are willing to pay for more privacy. Economists usually base

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consumers’ willingness-to-pay on observed market behavior, since how people behave when confronted with actual market choices better reflects their real preferences than responses to survey questionnaires or even behavior observed in experiments. The widespread use of free, advertising-supported services, such as search, email, and online news subscriptions, suggests that people routinely and voluntarily give up some information about themselves in return for access to content, more useful advertising, and other services, although the transaction is indirect. That is, consumers often are willing to exchange less privacy for the resulting benefits.

A recent paper by Athey, Catalani, and Tucker supports this observation. Their work highlights the “privacy paradox: [w]hereas people say they care about privacy, they are willing to relinquish private data quite easily when incentivized to do so.” Their results suggest, “[w]hen expressing a preference for privacy is essentially costless as it is in surveys, consumers are eager to express such a preference, but when faced with small costs this taste for privacy quickly dissipates.”

Businesses also evaluate the tradeoffs involved in collecting, using, and safeguarding the information they hold. Firms have a strong incentive to avoid data security breaches because markets penalize them if breaches occur. Costs include direct costs of addressing the breaches as well as potentially substantial reputational effects, as companies from Target to Equifax to Facebook quickly learn.

These costs are reflected in stock prices. Spanos and Angelis reviewed the literature on the impact of information security events on stock prices. Of the 28 studies that analyzed the impact of security breaches on the breached firm, 25 (89 percent) found a negative impact. In 20 of those studies (80 percent), the negative impact was statistically significant.

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13 *Id.* at 2.
14 *Id.* at 5. The authors offer a caveat to their finding: “On the one hand it might lead policy makers to question the value of stated preferences when determining privacy policy. On the other hand, it might suggest the need for more extensive privacy protections, from the standpoint that people need to be protected from their willingness to share data in exchange for relatively small monetary incentives.” *Id.* at 18.
16 *Id.*
17 *Id.*
example, lost about $6 billion in market capitalization after its breach. In a span of a week after the Cambridge Analytica episode became public, Facebook shareholders saw their equity value decline by 14 percent.

**GDPR and CCPA**

A major challenge for U.S. policy makers is how to respond to the European GDPR that became effective earlier this year and the recently-enacted CCPA, scheduled to become effective at the beginning of 2020. The RFC notes that major “high-level” goals for federal action are “harmonization” of the patchwork of competing state privacy laws and “interoperability” to reduce frictions on data flows across borders.

The GDPR applies to the data of EU citizens and the CCPA applies to businesses that operate in California. Companies that want to do business with European citizens and in California need to comply with both.

While the GDPR and the CCPA differ in important ways, they both limit the collection, use, sharing, and retention of data. The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) dating back to the 1970s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) Privacy Principles, and the Obama Administration’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights all take a similar approach.

Any regulation that restricts the use of information represents a tradeoff between the benefits of increased privacy and the cost of decreased information in the marketplace. Those costs will

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23 For example, the GDPR has more stringent consent requirements for the collection of consumer data, while the CCPA has more stringent consent requirements for sharing those data with third parties.
likely show up in decreased availability of content for consumers, a decline in innovation, and lower economic growth.

The Relevant Baseline

The Administration should demonstrate that any new approach it develops is likely to yield net benefits relative to the status quo, which is the current FTC approach of ex post enforcement. Such a demonstration involves showing that the new approach addresses actual harms the FTC cannot or does not address. Since benefits are a reduction in harms, if there are no harms, there can be no benefits, only costs. If there are benefits, the Administration still needs to demonstrate that those benefits are sufficient to outweigh the costs associated with having less information available.

The ex ante approach represented by the GDPR and CCPA contrasts with this ex post approach practiced in the U.S. and enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the principal U.S. privacy agency. As recently explained by former Acting FTC Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen:

> Our primary privacy and data security tool is case-by-case enforcement under Section 5 of the FTC Act to protect consumers from deceptive or unfair acts or practices. One significant benefit of this approach is that it limits the need for policymakers to predict future developments in the marketplace. This is especially important in the complex, fast changing technology industry and in areas such as privacy, where consumers have a wide range of evolving expectations and preferences. Case-by-case enforcement focuses on real-world facts and specifically alleged behaviors and injuries. Each case integrates feedback on earlier cases from consumers, industry, advocates, and, importantly, the courts. This ongoing process recognizes that markets, consumer expectations, and consumer benefits and risks evolve with new technologies, and it protects consumers while allowing innovation to occur.27

The FTC’s ex post enforcement-based approach has many advantages over an ex ante regulatory approach that prophylactically limits the collection, use, sharing, and retention of data in an attempt to protect consumers from hypothetical concerns about data being used in harmful ways. The ex post approach is based on actual harms and therefore more likely to improve consumer welfare.

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The NTIA’s Approach

The NTIA states that “[r]isk-based flexibility is…at the heart of the approach the Administration is requesting comment on in this RFC.”28 Further, it contends that “[t]he Administration is … proposing that discussion of consumer privacy in the United States refocus on the outcomes of organizational practices, rather than on dictating what those practices should be.”29

A risk-based approach that focuses on outcomes, rather than rules, could be a positive step toward developing policies that can pass a cost-benefit test and maximize net benefits to consumers. However, the Administration needs to clearly define the harms it proposes to address and explain why the proposed approach is better than the FTC’s current approach.

Identifying harms is difficult. During the last administration, the government issued at least five reports that failed to present evidence that data used for commercial and other non-surveillance purposes caused actual privacy harms.30 Discussions of harm in these reports are hypothetical and speculative.

Even in the area of data breaches, where one might expect better data because the costs might be more easily measurable, accurate data are unavailable. For example, the estimates of the total losses from the 2013 data breach of department store retailer Target Corporation range from $11 million to $4.9 billion.31 It is difficult to find evidence of harms associated with well-publicized quasi-data breach episodes, such as Facebook-Cambridge Analytica.32 One of the high-level goals listed in the RFC is to “incentivize privacy research.”33 A major focus should be on measuring harms associated with data security, and the effects of policies in reducing harms.

29 Id. at 48601.
Focusing on outcomes could mean something analogous to a performance standard in other areas of regulation. For example, an environmental performance standard might specify a maximum level of a pollutant a plant would be permitted to emit, leaving the plant to determine how to meet this requirement at minimum cost. Using outcomes as the relevant measure in the privacy context would mean focusing on some measure of privacy or privacy harms—for example, data breaches or identity fraud—as the relevant output. The RFC does not attempt to define such a measure.

Instead, the RFC defines outcomes to include transparency, control, and access. But these are all inputs, not outputs, and imply that the government would be dictating practices, which the RFC says NTIA does not want to do. Moreover, NTIA does not explain how these inputs would produce privacy benefits—i.e., reduce privacy harms. The NTIA should devote some resources to advancing our understanding of this issue.

The RFC acknowledges that its “outcomes” underpin “many of the principle-based approaches, including FIPPs.” However, the FIPPs approach to privacy has increasingly been criticized as irrelevant or counterproductive in the world of big data.

For example, for “control,” according to the RFC, “[u]sers should be able to exercise reasonable control over the collection, use, storage, and disclosure of the personal information they provide to organizations.” This would seem to imply a “Notice and Choice” framework, which has come to be seen as increasingly meaningless in the age of big data when many of the most productive uses of data are unpredictable. As the 2014 PCAST report noted, “[a]s a useful policy tool, notice and consent is defeated by exactly the positive benefits that big data enables: new, non-obvious, unexpectedly powerful uses of data. It is simply too complicated for the individual to make fine-grained choices for every new situation or app.”

The RFC also highlights the related issue of “transparency” as an outcome: “[u]sers should be able to easily understand how an organization collects, stores, uses, and shares their personal information.” The notion that consumers should understand how their data are being collected,
used, and shared seems appealing, but in the big data era where hundreds of data points and complex calculations are used to create some kind of score or index, it is likely to be impractical and not especially meaningful to consumers. This activity cannot be meaningfully conveyed through a simple notice, and consumers would not devote the hours required to understand such descriptions. It would likely be impossible for consumers without the necessary technical training to understand how firms use data, even without time constraints.

Moreover, consumers routinely exchange their information for a variety of benefits without reading and understanding privacy notices, suggesting that most consumers do not find it rational to spend the time and effort to do so. Former FTC officials Howard Beales and Timothy Muris observe that “the reality [is] that decisions about information sharing are not worth thinking about for the vast majority of consumers…” The recent PCAST report also addresses this issue, observing, “[o]nly in some fantasy world do users actually read these notices and understand their implications before clicking to indicate their consent.”

**Competition Considerations**

The NTIA should consider the competitive effect of privacy regulations. Theory and evidence suggest that such regulations favor large incumbents and make entry by new firms more difficult. This is reflected in the early experience with GDPR, which imposes large compliance costs. Companies like Google and Facebook are seen as benefiting relative to smaller advertising competitors under the new regime. The Financial Times reports that smaller U.S. companies are pulling out of the EU in reaction to the costs of complying with GDPR and the potential liability risks.

The transactions costs to consumers of providing consent under consent-based privacy regulation also favors large firms that offer a range of services. Small firms and new entrants are likely to be adversely affected because consumers incur larger transactions costs reading notices and

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39 PCAST Report, p. xi.
41 https://www.ft.com/content/3f079b6c-5ec8-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04. See also, “GDPR as Europe’s Tariff by Other Means?” http://www.aei.org/publication/gdpr-privacy-as-europes-tariff-by-other-means/.
indicating consent for a range of firms relative to, for example, a single firm offering the same set of services.\textsuperscript{42}

Finally, making it more difficult for data to be sold or otherwise transferred to third parties is a barrier to entry. Firms entering a market often need data on characteristics and preferences of their potential customers before they get started and can collect data from actual customers. If the data entrants can obtain from third parties is more costly and/or of lower quality, it will be more difficult for them to succeed.

**Harmonization, Interoperability, and Preemption**

As indicated above, a major Administration goal is to reduce fragmentation nationally and increase harmonization and interoperability nationally and globally, which raises the question of how the GDPR and the CCPA (and perhaps other state regulations) affect the cost-benefit calculus. One might argue, for example, that the U.S. should adopt a national regime following GDPR and CCPA, even if such a regime would not otherwise pass a cost-benefit threshold.

Global companies with significant business in Europe and California will likely need to comply with both sets of requirements even though compliance will be expensive. Forbes estimated that U.S. Fortune 500 and U.K. FTSE 350 companies spent nearly $9 billion ahead of the May 25 GDPR effective date.\textsuperscript{43} While large companies probably can’t avoid these expenditures, smaller companies may be able to. As the Forbes article notes, “There are two ways of avoiding GDPR—stop doing business in Europe entirely, or dump the personal data you’re holding—and both are proving popular.”\textsuperscript{44}

For a global company that is already complying with GDPR, the incremental costs of a similar regime in the U.S. would be small. Such companies might have an interest in seeing a GDPR-type of regime adopted in the U.S., because it would impose large costs that might not be


\textsuperscript{44} *Id*. 

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avoidable for smaller competitors. For startups, the costs of such a regime would be a major barrier to entry.

The considerations with respect to CCPA are somewhat different, since a national statute could preempt state laws. There is a strong rationale for preemption because the affected markets are national in scope. Without preemption, firms operating nationally would be forced to comply with the most stringent state requirements and perhaps also have to deal with inconsistent state laws. It is likely better to have privacy policy set at the national level, by lawmakers who presumably represent the nation as a whole, rather than have one state or set of states effectively “preempt” the rest of the country.

A national policy that preempted the states would make sense on cost-benefit grounds if the federal regulations were significantly better than the CCPA—i.e., placed fewer restrictions on the use of information and had a better balance of benefits and costs.

**Conclusion**

The FTC’s current *ex post* enforcement approach based on actual harms has great advantages relative to the *ex ante* regulatory approach reflected in the GDPR and CCPA. While there is a strong argument in favor of a national regime that would preempt state laws, there likely would be substantial costs associated with abandoning the current approach in favor of some variant of the approach taken by the GDPR and the CCPA—a GDPR- or CCPA-light. The NTIA would do well to identify the costs and benefits of proposed adjustments to the current federal approach to privacy regulation.